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PARENT COMPANY DIRECT LIABILITY FOR OVERSEAS 




Human rights violations are perpetrated by corporate actors 
with troubling frequency.  In most instances, victims do not have 
access to remedy.  For thirty years, the United States has been a 
beacon of hope, its courts adjudicating human rights claims against 
corporate defendants under the Alien Tort Statute.  Then, in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court closed the door on 
human rights plaintiffs.  This Article charts the rise of the United 
Kingdom as a venue to bring suit.  The U.K. Supreme Court, in a far-
reaching judgment from 2019, upheld a decision to allow plaintiffs 
to sue a London-headquartered parent company for grave 
environmental damage and harm to local communities’ livelihoods 
that occurred through the operations of the company’s Zambian 
subsidiary.  The dichotomy in approaches between the U.S. and the 
U.K. courts has prompted consideration of the following:  is there 
anything that can be drawn from the U.K. litigation to improve 
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access to remedy in the U.S. courts for victims of human rights 
violations by corporate actors?  This Article concludes that the 
argument used in the U.K. case law to attribute liability directly to 
parent companies should be taken up in the United States.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Impunity for human rights violations by corporate actors is a 
profound and pervasive injustice in the globalized world.  
Transnational business frequently operates in places where victims 
cannot get access to remedy in local courts.  There is no international 
forum that provides an alternative path to justice.  For thirty years, 
until recently, the United States offered a beacon of hope through 
adjudication of human rights cases against corporate defendants 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).  Then, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court closed the door on human rights 
plaintiffs by drastically curtailing the ATS.1  Later rulings of the 
Supreme Court dealt further blows to plaintiffs by limiting the 
courts’ personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants2 and 
prohibiting ATS claims against foreign companies.3  The very 
question of corporate liability under the statute now hangs in the 
balance.4 
As one door closes, another has opened.  The United Kingdom 
Supreme Court, in a far-reaching and underreported judgment from 
2019,5 confirmed a trend of English courts expanding the conditions 
under which a parent company can be held directly liable under the 
common law—not international law—for the tortious acts of its 
 
 1 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 2 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 3 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 4 Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020).  The case has been granted 
certiorari before the Supreme Court on the question of corporate liability.  Oral 
argument took place on Dec. 1, 2020.  Commentary about the oral argument is 
cautiously optimistic for the plaintiffs.  See Beth Van Schaack, Nestlé & Cargill v. 
Doe Series: In Oral Arguments, Justices Weigh Liability for Chocolate Companies, JUST 
SEC. (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73727/nestle-cargill-v-doe-
series-in-oral-arguments-justices-weigh-liability-for-chocolate-companies/ 
[https://perma.cc/XHF8-C3MK].  For a discussion of corporate liability under the 
ATS, see Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: 
Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008) and William S. Dodge, 
Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1045 (2012). 
 5 See Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (Eng.) (affirming 
Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 and Lungowe v. 
Vedanta Resources PLC [2016] EWHC 975 (TCC)).  See also Tara Van Ho, Vedanta 
Resources PLC and Another v. Lungowe and Others, 114 AM. J. INT’L. L 110 (2020); Dalia 
Palombo, The Duty of Care of the Parent Company: A Comparison between French Law, 
UK Precedents and the Swiss Proposals, 4 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 265 (2019). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/1
2021] Parent Company Direct Liability 523 
overseas subsidiaries.6  The result of this case, Lungowe v. Vedanta 
Resources, is that plaintiffs in transnational business and human 
rights litigation have a stronger foundation on which to build their 
tort claims for damages against parent companies.  The decision was 
unanimously reaffirmed by the U.K. Supreme Court in a second 
case, Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC.7  The legal argument for direct 
parent company liability used in Lungowe and Okpabi has been 
applied in other European countries8 and common law 
jurisdictions,9 demonstrating that the U.K. precedent is having an 
echo effect on international jurisprudence.  That effect has not yet 
been felt in the United States, however. 
The current dichotomy between the United States and the 
United Kingdom10 has prompted consideration of the following:  are 
the prospects for transnational business and human rights litigation 
in the United States as diminished as commentators portray them to 
be?  Is there anything that can be drawn from the U.K. experience to 
improve access to remedy in the U.S. courts for victims of human 
rights violations at the hands of corporate actors?  In answering 
these questions, this Article argues that expanding the 
circumstances in which a common law duty of care is imposed on a 
parent company for harm that occurs through its overseas 
operations is vital to enable victims to vindicate their rights against 
one of the actors that caused them harm.   
Direct parent company liability is the key to achieving this 
vindication.  By acknowledging the multiple ways in which the 
 
 6 The U.K. is divided into four separate legal jurisdictions, one of which is 
England and Wales.  For the purposes of this Article, only this jurisdiction will be 
considered and references to England and the English courts shall be deemed to 
include Wales and Welsh courts. 
 7 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 (overturning Okpabi v. 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191 and Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC [2017] EWHC 89 (TCC)). 
 8 See, e.g., Rb. Den Haag 30 januari 2013, JOR 2013, 162 m.nt. JF (Akpan/Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s-Den Haag 18 december 2015, NJF 2015, 3857 m.nt. 
F.C.S. Warendorf (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s-Den Haag 29 
januari 2021, NJ 2021, 77 m.nt. (Milieudefensie/Shell Petroleum NV) (Neth.). 
 9 See, e.g., Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] ONSC 1414 (Can. Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.). 
 10 The difference between the two pivotal decisions from the United States 
and the United Kingdom, Kiobel and Lungowe, respectively, has been described as 
“night and day.”  See Doug Cassel, Vedanta v. Lungowe Symposium: Beyond 
Vedanta–Reconciling Tort Law with International Human Rights Norms, OPINIO JURIS 
(Apr. 19, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/19/vedanta-v-lungowe-
symposium-beyond-vedanta-reconciling-tort-law-with-international-human-right
s-norms%EF%BB%BF/ [https://perma.cc/43A5-EXFB].   
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relationship between parent and subsidiary companies is conducted 
in a modern global enterprise, and attributing liability for 
intervention on the parent’s part that has been instrumental in the 
harm the plaintiffs have suffered, the direct liability approach not 
only opens up the possibility of substantive parent company 
liability, but also connects the allegations in the case to the U.S. 
territory by focusing on the culpable actions or omissions of the U.S. 
parent company that occur at the headquarter level.  This provides 
a counterpoint to the forum non conveniens defense and to concerns 
about infringement on host state sovereignty which infuse the recent 
ATS case law.  Moreover, the relative success of the direct liability 
argument and the receptiveness of the courts in the United Kingdom 
and other jurisdictions to these claims11 may be a powerful 
argument to counter the unease about jurisdictional overreach that 
underlies recent Supreme Court decisions.12 
The Article is organized in five parts.  Part II traces the global 
trend in growth of transnational business and human rights 
litigation, noting the hurdles to bringing such cases, and 
highlighting the particular challenge presented by the corporate 
veil.  Part III explores the current status of transnational business 
and human rights litigation in both federal and state courts.  It 
briefly outlines the history of ATS claims, identifying the legal 
hurdles to their success.  It considers the parallel conventional tort 
litigation trend both pre and post Kiobel, asking whether, in the 
period since Kiobel, the predicted wave of state tort litigation has 
materialized,13 and identifying legal hurdles to success in such cases.  
Turning the focus to the role of the corporate veil, Part III also 
discusses how liability is attributed to the parent company in 
transnational business and human rights litigation in the United 
States and, in particular, the test of agency.  In Part IV, the case 
analysis turns to England.  This has been the primary venue for 
transnational business and human rights litigation outside the 
 
 11 See, e.g., Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya (2020), 443 D.L.R. 4th 183 (Can.) 
(holding that a claim for customary international law violations could proceed to 
trial before the Canadian courts). 
 12 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Daimler AG 
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 13 See generally Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and 
the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089 (2014) (arguing that the 
most likely avenue for plaintiffs post Kiobel will be pleading violations of state or 
foreign tort laws). 
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United States,14 although Canada may possibly surpass it after the 
recent Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.15  The focus here is on the development of direct liability 
for the tort of negligence as a means of attributing liability to the 
parent company, and the application of the test.  Part V draws 
together examples from other common law and civil law 
jurisdictions where the direct liability argument has been used in 
tort litigation, to demonstrate the uptake and development of the 
legal principle internationally.  Part VI compares the agency 
approach adopted by courts in the United States with the direct 
liability approach taken in the United Kingdom and considers what 
lessons for the United States can be drawn from the English 
litigation.  It concludes that the argument used in the U.K. case law 
to attribute liability directly to parent companies should be taken up 
in the United States. 
 
 14 See Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. 
Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 127-28 (2013); Astrid 
Sanders, The Impact of the ‘Ruggie Framework’ and the ‘United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’ on Transnational Human Rights Litigation, in 
THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 
288, 290 (Jena Martin & Karen Bravo eds., 2015); see also TREVOR C. HARTLEY, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 310 (2009) (discussing the advantages of bringing legal 
proceedings in the English courts); Jonathan Watts, BHP Billiton Facing £5bn Lawsuit 
from Brazilian Victims of Dam Disaster, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/06/bhp-billiton-facing-
5bn-lawsuit-from-brazilian-victims-of-dam-disaster [https://perma.cc/XYZ8-
E42P] (detailing cases against BHP Billiton for a dam disaster in Brazil); Município 
de Mariana v. BHP Group PLC [2020] EWHC 2930 (TCC); John Vidal, ‘Mollah’s Life 
was Typical’: The Deadly Ship Graveyards of Bangladesh, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jan/31/khalid-molla
h-life-was-typical-the-deadly-ship-graveyards-of-bangladesh?CMP=Share_iOSAp
p_Other [https://perma.cc/T6QE-GUVR] (describing litigation against shipping 
company Maran for the death of a ship breaker in Bangladesh); Hamida Begum v. 
Maran (UK) Ltd [2020] EWHC 1846 (QB); Hamida Begum v. Maran (UK) Ltd [2021] 
EWHC Civ 326; Tanzanian Victims Commence Legal Action in UK against Barrick (Feb. 
10, 2020), https://www.raid-uk.org/blog/tanzanian-victims-commence-legal-
action-uk-against-barrick [https://perma.cc/2RBF-ZUUX] (regarding litigation 
against Barrick Tz alleging serious abuses by security forces in Tanzania); Kate 
Hodal, Petra Diamonds Pays £4.3m to Tanzanians ‘Abused’ by its Contractors, 
GUARDIAN (May 18, 2021), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/18/petra-diamo
nds-pays-43m-to-tanzanians-abused-by-its-contractors [https://perma.cc/5D5J-
X58A]; Sarah Boseley, Tobacco Firms in Move to Strike out Malawi Exploitation Case, 
GUARDIAN (May 19, 2021), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/may/19/tobacco-firms-in-move-
to-strike-out-malawi-exploitation-case [https://perma.cc/4HVG-JX44]. 
 15 Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya (2020), 443 D.L.R. 4th 183 (Can.).  
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II. BARRIERS TO TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS LITIGATION:  THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 
This Part introduces transnational business and human rights 
litigation and the role of the corporate veil as an impediment to 
plaintiffs bringing such cases. 
a. Business and Human Rights Litigation:  The Global Picture 
A number of jurisdictions have developed a body of 
jurisprudence, which, to varying degrees, allows their courts to 
accept jurisdiction over claims where extraterritorial human rights 
violations committed by or in conjunction with corporate actors are 
framed as tort lawsuits and brought against a parent company in its 
home state.16  The development of this body of jurisprudence dates 
back to the 1980s when one of the original transnational tort claims 
was brought in U.S. courts following the catastrophic chemical leak 
at Bhopal in India.17  The American parent company, Union Carbide, 
was alleged to be liable in tort on the grounds that it exercised 
extensive control over its Indian subsidiary, the operator of the 
pesticides plant in Bhopal from where the chemicals leaked, killing 
and injuring tens of thousands of people.18  That control was 
evidenced, for instance, by the parent company’s involvement in 
key decisions regarding plant design and safety.19  The U.S. courts’ 
dismissal of the case on grounds that India was the appropriate 
 
 16 The term “home state” in relation to a multinational group of companies is 
used to denote the state in which the parent company is a corporate national.  From 
a commercial, but not necessarily legal, perspective, this is the place where the 
group is headquartered or where the relevant decisions about actions in the host 
state are taken.  The term “host state” refers to any state other than the home state 
in which that group operates or invests, or which is a significant source of goods or 
services for the group or its constituent companies. 
 17 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 
U.S. 199 (1987). 
 18 Id. at 844.  
 19 AMNESTY INT’L, INJUSTICE INCORPORATED: CORPORATE ABUSES AND THE 
HUMAN RIGHT TO REMEDY 33-37 (2014). 
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forum for the litigation,20 and the subsequent low value settlement 
of all proceedings against the corporate group by the Government 
of India,21 highlighted how difficult it is for victims in transnational 
business and human rights litigation to get access to remedy.  The 
gravity of the injustice for the victims of Bhopal fomented the 
emerging international movement that demanded corporate 
accountability for extraterritorial harms.22 
In the years that followed the initiation of the Bhopal litigation, 
a number of tort claims were brought before U.S.—mainly federal—
courts23 against American parent companies regarding the overseas 
operations of their subsidiaries.24  From the 1990s onwards, the 
federal ATS became the most common cause of action for plaintiffs 
bringing suit against corporations for alleged human rights 
violations overseas.  Conventional tort claims were sometimes 
brought in parallel with ATS claims.25  During this period, tort cases 
were also initiated against corporate defendants in England and 
Wales,26 Canada,27 and Australia.28  With no statutory equivalent to 
the ATS, these cases in other common law countries were framed as 
conventional tort claims, and were dwarfed in number by the ATS 
claims.29  In recent years, since the U.S. Supreme Court cut back the 
 
 20 In re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp at 866. 
 21 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19, at 48-53. 
 22 The litigation about Bhopal against Union Carbide and its successor 
company Dow continues to this day.  See id. at 33-63; Anita Ramasastry, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between 
Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 237, 240 (2015); Surya Deva, Bhopal: 
The Sage Continues 31 Years On, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  FROM PRINCIPLES 
TO PRACTICE 24 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2014).   
 23 Filing in federal district courts is under the diversity jurisdiction set out in 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 24 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 
303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (filed in 1993). 
 25 The difference between the two is that the ATS claims allege violations of 
customary international law norms, while the conventional tort claims allege 
federal or state torts as grounds for liability.  See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 26 Connelly v. RTZ Corp. [1998] A.C. 854 (HL); Sithole v. Thor Chem. 
Holdings, Ltd. [1999] EWCA (Civ) 706; Lubbe v. Cape PLC [2000] UKHL 41 (HL). 
 27 Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc., 1998 CarswellQue 1430 
(Can. Que. Sup. Ct.). 
 28 Dagi v Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. (1997) 1 VR 428 (Austl.). 
 29 Andrew Sanger, Corporations and Transnational Litigation: Comparing Kiobel 
with the Jurisprudence of English Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L UNBOUND 23 (2014); Peter 
Muchlinski & Virginie Rouas, Foreign Direct-Liability Litigation: Towards the 
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scope of the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.30 and Jesner v. 
Arab Bank,31 there has been renewed interest among the academy in 
common law tort claims as a vehicle for this litigation.32  Some 
scholars have looked to non-U.S. experience of such claims as 
offering a way forward for business and human rights litigation.33  
There are a number of challenges that plaintiffs in these 
conventional tort claims must overcome, however. 
b. The Corporate Veil 
Three separate but interlocked veils operate to shield parent 
companies from liability in transnational business and human rights 
claims, namely:  the corporate veil, the contractual veil, and the 
jurisdictional veil.34  With the corporate veil, the issue is how to 
attribute liability to the parent company when it has some direct 
knowledge and level of involvement in the misconduct, but the 
proximate cause of the harm is the subsidiary company’s actions.35  
 
Transnationalization of Corporate Legal Responsibility, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS 357 (Lara Blecher 
et al. eds., 2014); Richard Meeran, Tort Litigation Against Multinational Corporations 
for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United States, 3 
CITY U. H.K.L. REV. 1 (2011); SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (2004). 
 30 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 31 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (discussed further in Part III); see also Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 32 Roger P. Alford, for example, argues, “[t]he most important alternative 
avenue [to the ATS] is tort law.  Indeed, one could say that the future of human 
rights litigation in the United States depends on refashioning human rights claims 
as state or foreign tort violations.”  Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights 
Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1749-50 (2014).  For other 
examples, see infra note 113. 
 33 Goldhaber, supra note 14, at 128; see also Jodie A. Kirshner, A Call for the EU 
to Assume Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 13 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 17 (2015); Doug Cassel, Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty 
of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 179 
(2016). 
 34 See Peter Muchlinski, Limited Liability and Multinational Enterprises: A Case 
for Reform?, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 915, 920 (2010) (introducing the concept of the 
jurisdictional veil). 
 35 Attributing liability to parent companies in transnational tort litigation is 
the subject of numerous scholarly works.  Foundational contributions from Phillip 
I. Blumberg on corporate groups and the drawbacks of limited liability form the 
backdrop to the discussion in this Article.  See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability 
and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986). 
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The long-established corporate law principles of the corporate veil, 
separate personality, and limited liability operate to prevent the 
parent corporation from being liable for the subsidiary’s 
wrongdoing.  With the contractual veil, in circumstances where the 
relationship is not one of equity but rather one of contract between 
the parent (also called “lead”) company and its suppliers, the 
separate personalities of the corporations and the terms of their 
contractual relationship prevent the parent company from being 
liable for the supplier’s wrongdoing.  With the jurisdictional veil, the 
territorial sovereignty principle from public international law gives 
the host state authority to prescribe rules governing people and 
events on its territory, and to adjudicate related disputes.  A 
corollary of territorial sovereignty is the jurisdictional veil, which 
limits the home state’s power to exercise its legal authority 
extraterritorially in order to prescribe rules and adjudicate disputes 
when harm occurs in the host state.  While all three veils act to shield 
parent companies from liability when harm occurs ostensibly at the 
hands of a subsidiary or supplier, it is the corporate veil that is the 
focus here.  Positive case law developments outside the United 
States—which have triggered the authorship of this Article—have 
helped to lessen the strictures of the corporate veil.36  The role of the 
jurisdictional veil as an impediment to plaintiffs’ success in 
transnational business and human rights litigation against parent 
companies will be touched on, as well, given its significance as a 
hurdle to plaintiffs in U.S.  litigation exemplified in cases dismissed 
on grounds of forum non conveniens or the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
The basic premise of the corporate veil was set out by the U.S.  
Supreme Court in United States v. Bestfoods, “[i]t is a general principle 
of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in our economic and legal 
systems’ that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its 
subsidiaries.”37  “The doctrine of limited liability holds that, in 
principle, the shareholders in a business may not be held liable for 
 
 36 It has been argued that direct liability can also be applicable when 
companies are divided by the contractual veil.  See Landgericht Dortmund 
[Dortmund District Court] Jan. 10, 2019, 7 O 95/15, Justiz-online (Ger.) 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/dortmund/lg_dortmund/j2019/7_O_95_1
5_Urteil_20190110.html [https://perma.cc/FQP5-JJKE]; see also infra Part V. The 
focus here is primarily on companies linked by equity. 
 37 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, 
Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193, 193 (1929)). 
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the debts of that business beyond the level of their investment.”38  
The related doctrine of separate personality holds that the legal 
personality of one business is distinct from the legal personality of 
another business, separating them by a corporate veil, regardless of 
the links of ownership and/or control between them. 
Historically, limited liability existed to encourage economic 
growth by protecting entrepreneurs so that they could invest in 
businesses without fear of personal liability.  But, as Phillip 
Blumberg famously noted, the concept of limited liability originates 
from a time when corporations were not generally allowed to hold 
shares in other corporations, meaning that the parent–subsidiary 
relationship did not exist.39  The use of the corporate veil to shield 
parent companies from liability for the debts of their subsidiaries in 
corporate groups “opens the door to multiple layers of insulation 
[from liability], a consequence unforeseen when limited liability was 
[first] adopted.”40  It also belies the links of strategy, control and 
other forms of intervention that connect the different companies in 
a corporate group and that are recognized economically and 
politically,41 provoking some scholars to advocate for wholesale 
reform of limited liability in human rights cases against 
corporations.42 
 
 38 GWYNNE SKINNER, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE & OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, THE 
THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 57 (2013) (citing Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-62 
(1944)). 
 39 Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers 
Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 297, 300–04 (2001). 
 40 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW:  
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 139 (1993). 
 41 Blumberg, supra note 39, at 303.  Ironically, empirical studies have shown 
that courts are less likely to pierce the corporate veil to expose the corporate 
shareholders in corporate groups, as opposed to individual shareholders.  See 
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1036, 1038 (1991). 
 42 See Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for 
Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1769 (2015); Anil Yilmaz Vastardis & Rachel Chambers, Overcoming the 
Corporate Veil Challenge: Could Investment Law Inspire the Proposed Business and 
Human Rights Treaty?, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 389 (2018).  To address this problem, 
Skinner proposed a new statute-based model that would allow courts to disregard 
limited liability of parent corporations for claims of customary international human 
rights violations and serious environmental torts, where a parent corporation takes 
a majority interest or creates a subsidiary as part of a unified economic enterprise 
that operates in a “high-risk host country.”  See GWYNNE SKINNER, PARENT COMPANY 
ACCOUNTABILITY:  ENSURING JUSTICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 24 (2015). 
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There are various techniques that plaintiffs in tort litigation may 
adopt to attribute liability to the parent company when it has some 
direct knowledge and some level of involvement in the subsidiary’s 
alleged wrongdoing.43  The first option is to seek to pierce the 
corporate veil and make the parent company liable for the 
negligence of its subsidiary.  Tests vary for veil piercing, but in most 
jurisdictions this power is reserved for exceptional cases only.44  In 
the United States, there are different tests applied in different states.  
But, generally speaking, the corporate veil can only be pierced when 
the parent “misuses the separate corporate form for wrongful 
purposes and controls the subsidiary to the extent that the 
subsidiary is a mere instrument of the parent.”45  Scholars have 
documented that veil-piercing tests are vague and inconsistently 
applied by the courts.46  Plaintiffs therefore use other methods to 
attribute liability to the parent company:  in particular they allege 
that the subsidiary acted as an agent for the parent company in the 
particular action that gave rise to the claim.47 
As discussed below,48 establishing agency is a significant hurdle 
for plaintiffs to surmount, although not as difficult as veil piercing.  
Another technique that has been used in tort cases in common law 
countries outside the United States is to allege that the parent 
company is directly liable for harm in respect of its own primary 
breach of duty, based on the parent owing its own duty of care to 
the plaintiffs.  This theory, sometimes referred to as “foreign direct 
liability,”49 holds that “when a parent company is directly involved 
[to a sufficient degree] in its subsidiary’s operations or exercises de 
 
 43 This Article does not address the problem identified by Skinner of “victims 
left without a remedy where the parent has a more separate relationship from the 
subsidiary but still greatly benefits financially from the fact that it created a 
subsidiary in a high-risk environment.”  Skinner, supra note 42, at 1841. 
 44 Thompson, supra note 41, at 1044-45.  Frequently the veil will only be 
pierced “where there has been fraud or where the level of control by the parent 
company is so extreme as to render the corporation an alter ego or a sham.”  
Vastardis & Chambers, supra note 42, at 394-95.  In English case law, an example of 
this strict approach is Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1989] AC 433 (appeal taken 
from EWHC (Ch)) (Eng.). 
 45 Skinner, supra note 42, at 1797. 
 46 Id. at 1798. 
 47 Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 48 See generally infra Part III (discussing agency). 
 49 See generally Liesbeth Enneking, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? 
Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case, UTRECHT L. REV., 
Jan. 2014, at 44 (charting the international trend of foreign direct liability cases and 
the Dutch Shell Nigeria case’s status as part of that trend). 
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facto control, then it owes a duty of care to its employees or anyone 
affected by its [subsidiary’s] operations . . . [and] may be held liable 
for harm flowing from its failure to competently perform the 
functions” of its involvement.50  The development of direct liability 
in case law is addressed in Parts III and IV below. 
c. Arguments in Favor of Parent Company Liability 
Attributing liability to the parent company allows plaintiffs to 
bring within the frame of judicial consideration the parent’s acts of 
supervision, management, and control of the subsidiary, which may 
have been instrumental in the harm the plaintiffs have suffered, 
ostensibly at the hands of the subsidiary.  Furthermore, plaintiffs can 
sue the parent company in the home state, its incorporation there 
providing the required connection to the jurisdiction to enable the 
home state courts to hear the claim, in accordance with the relevant 
rules of domestic private international law.51  The necessity for 
plaintiffs to have access to remedy in the courts of the home state of 
the parent company as a result of the widely acknowledged 
governance gap in corporate accountability is well covered in the 
literature.52  In some instances, this is the only option for them when 
host state remedies are absent or ineffective due to corruption, 
weakness or absence of the rule of law, lack of financial resources to 
enforce local laws, hold timely trials, etc.53  Accessing remedy in 
home state courts also avoids plaintiffs having to seek compensation 
from a local subsidiary, which may be impecunious or defunct. 
 
 50 Goldhaber, supra note 14, at 132. 
 51 The relevant cases on personal jurisdiction over corporate defendants are 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) and Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).  For European Union states, jurisdiction is 
governed by the Brussels Regulation recast, Council Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.  2012 O.J. (L 351/1) art. 4 [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. 
 52 See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014). 
 53 The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from around the mid twentieth 
century onwards has been from industrialized countries of the Global North to 
developing countries of the Global South.  Although this pattern is changing, with 
the result that “host state” is no longer synonymous with “developing country,” 
this Article takes as its focus host countries of the Global South which may exhibit 
the access to remedy problems listed here. 
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The normative justification for holding a parent company 
accountable for its negligent involvement in the harmful operations 
of its subsidiary is compelling.54  The ability of parent companies to 
exert influence and control across the whole corporate group while 
retaining legal separation from the entities that comprise the rest of 
the group makes transnational business uniquely able to take 
advantage of the economic and regulatory reality of the globalized 
world in which it operates.55  For example, it allows parent 
companies to structure their liability risk by sometimes 
undercapitalizing their foreign subsidiaries that might be the target 
for claims due to the nature of the activities they undertake, or due 
to the lower social or environmental standards adopted by business 
in many developing host states,56 while at the same time often 
“reap[ing] large economic benefits from these [] subsidiaries.”57 
John Ruggie, the architect of the current international policy 
consensus in this area—the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (“UNGPs”)58—explicitly recognized the role of tort 
law in providing access to remedy to victims of human rights abuse 
at the hands of corporations,59 and urged states to address the 
difficulties created by the corporate veil.  Without making this a 
legal obligation, the UNGPs tell states that in extraterritorial cases 
 
 54 See SKINNER, supra note 42. 
 55 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5-8 (2d ed. 
2007); JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43-53 
(2005). 
 56 The double standards practice of transnational business in relation to 
environmental standards has been documented in at least two U.N. studies, 
surveying businesses adopting lower environmental standards in the surveyed 
developing countries than those adopted in developed countries.  See Tetsuya 
Morimoto, Research Paper, Growing Industrialization and our Damaged Planet: The 
Extraterritorial Application of Developed Countries’ Domestic Environmental Laws to 
Transnational Corporations Abroad, UTRECHT L. REV., DEC. 2005, AT 134, 137. 
 57 Vivian Grosswald Curran, Harmonizing Multinational Parent Company 
Liability for Foreign Subsidiary Human Rights Violations, 17 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 403, 411 
(2016). 
 58 Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31, annex (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs]. 
 59 Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 9, 2007). 
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they should consider ways to reduce the barriers that could lead to 
a denial of access to remedy.60  Such barriers include “[t]he way in 
which legal responsibility is attributed among members of a 
corporate group” in a way that facilitates the “avoidance of 
appropriate accountability.”61  Despite this recognition, and the 
unanimous endorsement of the UNGPs by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council,62 it remains the position that access to remedy is the most 
neglected of the three UNGP pillars,63 and the global pattern is that 
victims of business-related human rights abuse in extraterritorial 
cases do not generally have access to effective remedies.64  One of 
the key reasons for this is the difficulty tort plaintiffs have in 
attributing liability to parent companies because of the corporate 
veil.65 
III. TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Part begins with a summary of the legal history and current 
status of ATS and conventional tort litigation in the United States, 
which grounds the analysis of whether prospects for such cases are 
as diminished as commentators portray them to be.66  It explores the 
reasons why courts have dismissed the majority of such claims and 
the role of the corporate veil as a hurdle to plaintiffs.  This Part 
examines how plaintiffs seek to attribute liability to the parent 
company in transnational business and human rights litigation, 
 
 60 UNGPs, supra note 58, at 23. 
 61 Id.  Another barrier is “[w]here claimants face a denial of justice in a host 
State and cannot access home State courts regardless of the merits of the claim.”  Id. 
 62 State membership of the Human Rights Council at the time included the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  Membership of the Human Rights Council 19 
June 2010 - 18 June 2011 by Year When Term Expires, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Year20102011.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BZ72-VJ6G]. 
 63 The other pillars are the state duty to protect and the corporate 
responsibility to respect.  UNGPs, supra note 58, at 4. 
 64 Cassel, supra note 33, at 182. 
 65 Skinner, supra note 42, at 1804 n.120; SKINNER, MCCORQUODALE & DE 
SCHUTTER, supra note 38, at 56-59. 
 66 A comprehensive review of the history of ATS litigation is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  For an overall history and analysis of ATS cases, see Beth Stephens, 
The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467 (2014) and 
Beth Stephens, The Rise and Fall of the Alien Tort Statute, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 46 (Surya Deva & David Birchall eds., 2020). 
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using an emblematic example, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining 
Corporation.67  There follows, in Part VI, a comparison of the relevant 
law in the United States and the United Kingdom, and 
recommendations for U.S. courts. 
a. The ATS:  The Rise and Fall of the Statute 
The United States, through the ATS, was the dominant 
jurisdiction in the field of transnational business and human rights 
litigation for a number of years.  Already the subject of voluminous 
scholarship, the ATS of 1789 grants district courts original 
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”68   Thus, and uniquely so, it links public international law to 
tort law.  In the landmark case of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,69 the “flagrant 
disregard of basic human rights and particularly the right to be free 
of torture” was found to be actionable under the ATS, ushering in a 
new era of human rights litigation.70  In 1997, in a case concerning 
alleged corporate complicity in serious human rights violations 
including forced labor, extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape 
suffered by the plaintiffs at the hands of the Burmese military in 
connection with the construction of a natural gas pipeline in Burma, 
it was held for the first time that the courts have authority to 
adjudicate claims against corporations and their executive officers 
under the ATS, and that corporations and their executive officers 
could be held liable for violating norms of customary international 
law.71  This litigation, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., marked the beginning of 
 
 67 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2018), vacated and remanded, 765 F. App’x 811 
(3d Cir. 2019). 
 68 Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 69 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 70 Id. at 890. 
 71 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).  Note that when this 
question came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), the court dismissed the claim 
because it interpreted customary international law as being inapplicable to 
corporations.  The decision was the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court 
which went on to address a different question, namely whether courts may 
recognize causes of action for violations of international law within the territory of 
a country other than the U.S.  In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018), the 
Supreme Court was split on whether corporations can be liable under the ATS. 
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a trend of suing corporations under the ATS that saw about 180 
claims filed by 2013.72 
The contemporary use of the ATS was first reviewed by the 
Supreme Court not in a business and human rights case, but in 
litigation alleging the forcible abduction of a murder suspect:  Sosa 
v. Álvarez-Machain.73  The judgment in Sosa, acknowledging foreign 
relations concerns that call for judicial restraint in ATS litigation, 
affirmed the recent ATS case law but emphasized, inter alia, that only 
a “narrow set of violations”—those “threatening serious 
consequences in international affairs”—could be invoked under the 
statute.74 
When the Supreme Court reviewed the contemporary use of the 
ATS for a second time, in the business and human rights case Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., it curtailed the reach of the statute 
dramatically.75  The corporate defendants, Royal Dutch Petroleum 
(the Anglo Dutch parent company) and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (its Nigerian subsidiary), were accused of 
being instrumental in the actions of the Nigerian military against 
protesters in the Niger Delta.76  Violations of jus cogens were among 
the allegations.77  The case was rejected in the district court and on 
 
 72 For a full list of ATS cases where at least one defendant is a corporate entity, 
see Goldhaber, supra note 14, at 137-49 (list compiled by Jonathan Drimmer).  For a 
breakdown of “where they are filed, against whom, and why,” see Jonathan C. 
Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court 
Tactics in Transitional Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 461-464 (2011). 
 73 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 74 Id. at 715.  The Court ruled that the ATS is a jurisdictional act, which does 
not create a cause of action based on customary international law but entitles 
plaintiffs to bring actions in court for the violation of customary international law 
on the basis of a common law cause of action in tort.  Lower courts were urged to 
exercise “great caution” in cases that raised risks of adverse foreign policy 
consequences.  Id. at 694. 
 75 569 U.S. 108 (2013); see Robert C. Bird, Daniel R. Cahoy & Lucien J. Dhooge, 
Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights in the Post-Kiobel World, 102 KY. 
L.J. 601 (2013).  There was no challenge to personal jurisdiction.  A companion case, 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002), alleging similar facts but brought by different plaintiffs, 
had been successfully settled prior to Kiobel.  In this litigation, the court accepted 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the majority of the claims and dismissed the 
defense of forum non conveniens.  The federal court indicated in this preliminary 
decision that SPDC was the alter ego of the defendant parent corporation.  JOSEPH, 
supra note 29, at 130. 
 76 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 113. 
 77 Id.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a jus cogens norm 
as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
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appeal.  It came to the Supreme Court following a decision of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that corporations could 
not be held liable for violations of customary international law, and 
thus could not be sued under the ATS.78  Unexpectedly, however, 
the Supreme Court asked for additional argument on whether and 
in what circumstances the ATS could be applied to conduct outside 
the United States.79 
The judgment turned on whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality of federal statute-law based claims applied to the 
ATS and, if so, how it should be applied in the particular case.  The 
majority opinion in the Court held that the principles that underlie 
the presumption against extraterritoriality should indeed apply 
under the ATS80 because of “the danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy.”81  The Court found 
nothing in the text of the ATS that evinced “the requisite clear 
indication of extraterritoriality.”82  The Court clarified, however, 
that, in some circumstances, a claim might have sufficient ties with 
the United States to dislodge the presumption.  Where claims “touch 
and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient 
force” they will “displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application,” even if they arise outside of the United States.83  This 
touch and concern standard was not met in Kiobel, however, in 
which violations occurred outside of U.S. territory and the corporate 
defendants were foreign too.  The outcome of Kiobel came as a blow 
to corporate accountability advocates.  Up until that point, most, if 
not all, ATS cases against corporate defendants concerned harmful 
events that occurred overseas.  The decision in Kiobel that the 
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality 
apply to the ATS therefore represented a sea-change in the 
 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 78 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 79 Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 5, 
2012), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/ 
[https://perma.cc/S4Y5-PNSM]. 
 80 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25. 
 81 Id. at 116. 
 82 Id. at 119. 
 83 Id. at 124-25. 
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interpretation of the statute,84 and provoked doomsday predictions 
about the future of ATS litigation.85 
Kiobel has not quite been the “death knell” to ATS human rights 
litigation that some predicted, however.86  In the years since the 
decision, some courts—albeit a minority—have allowed ATS 
litigation to proceed, finding that the claims touch and concern the 
United States with sufficient force,87 but there has been 
inconsistency among the circuits in their application of the touch 
and concern test, resulting in different outcomes for plaintiffs.  These 
applications vary from requiring that the alleged violations of 
customary international law took place in the United States,88 to a 
more fact-based inquiry looking at different aspects of the case 
including the citizenship of the defendants and potential U.S. 
national interests triggered by the nature of the defendants’ 
conduct.89  Proving that the alleged violation of customary 
international law took place in the United States is very challenging 
for plaintiffs in transnational business and human rights litigation, 
 
 84 See Beth Stephens, Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After Kiobel, 28 MD. 
J. INT’L L. 256 (2013). 
 85 See Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel, 39 
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 172-173 (2013). 
 86 Id. at 172.  An example of a case that was dismissed on the basis of Kiobel is 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2013).  See William S. Dodge, 
Business and Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Before and After Kiobel, in 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 244, 250 (Dorothée 
Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016); Jennifer M. Green, The Rule of Law at a 
Crossroad: Enforcing Corporate Responsibility in International Investment Through the 
Alien Tort Statute, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1085 (2014).  The Institute for Legal Reform 
tracks the status of ATS litigation against U.S. companies after the Supreme Court’s 
Kiobel decision and reports that of forty cases that were pending at the time of Kiobel, 
only 13% have been allowed to proceed on the merits.  See INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, LAWSUITS AGAINST CORPORATIONS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 3, 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Lawsuits_Against_C
orporations_Under_the_Alien_Tort_Statute_.pdf [https://perma.cc/R43Q-766G]. 
 87 Dodge, supra note 86, at 250 (citing Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 
758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014)); see also Doe I v. Nestlé, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010), vacated by 738 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 88 See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 194-97 (5th Cir. 
2017). 
 89 See Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 595-96 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(describing the U.S. citizenship of defendants and the allegation that the defendants 
funded an organization designated by the Department of State as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization as relevant to the “touch and concern” inquiry, but 
insufficient on their own to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
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but the more fact-based inquiry is a significant hurdle, too.90  Some 
respite for plaintiffs has come in a decision of the Ninth Circuit, 
which refined the requirement that the alleged violations of 
international law take place in the United States, holding that the 
“focus” of the ATS (a test from the case RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Cmty.91) was not limited to the principal offenses but also to aiding 
and abetting. 92 
Other challenges for ATS plaintiffs have arisen.  First, case law 
development in the law on personal jurisdiction over corporate 
defendants has had the effect of restricting the ability of plaintiffs to 
sue foreign corporations, impacting ATS cases in particular.93 
Pursuant to these cases, in nearly all circumstances, a corporation 
must be headquartered or incorporated in the forum state to be sued 
there.94  This hurdle for plaintiffs was solidified in ATS cases with 
the prohibition against suing foreign corporations under this statute 
that was instituted in Jesner v. Arab Bank.95  Second, and of even 
greater concern to corporate accountability advocates, the question 
of whether corporations can be held liable for violations of 
customary international law resurfaced in Jesner.96  The Justices left 
this issue unresolved, leaving the door open to defendants to 
challenge corporate liability under the ATS in subsequent cases,97 
with success on at least one occasion.98  The Supreme Court recently 
heard argument on this question in the case of Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe 
I,99 a class action claim by Malian child plaintiffs allegedly trafficked 
 
 90 See Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2289 
(2017); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-29 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 91 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
 92 Doe I v. Nestlé, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018), amended by 929 F.3d 623 
(9th Cir. 2019).  This decision is the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court: 
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S.Ct. 188 (2020). 
 93 See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reconciling Transnational Jurisdiction: A 
Comparative Approach to Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporate Defendants in U.S. 
Courts, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.  1243 (2018); Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Reforming 
International Human Rights Litigation against Corporate Defendants after Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 757 (2019). 
 94 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 95 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). 
 96 Id. at 1400; see William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability Under the US Alien Tort 
Statute: A Comment on Jesner v. Arab Bank, 4 BUS & HUM. RTS. J. 131 (2019). 
 97 Id. at 1402.  See Doe I v. Nestlé, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018), amended 
by 929 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2019); Estate of Alvarez v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 670 (D. Md. 2017). 
 98 Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 99 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020). 
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by cocoa growers into Côte D’Ivoire and forced to work in farms that 
supplied cocoa beans to defendants.100  The Trump Administration 
supported the defendant companies by arguing in an amicus brief 
that corporate liability is precluded under the ATS.101 
The preceding paragraphs have described the hurdles that ATS 
plaintiffs now face.  Even prior to the seismic changes brought about 
by the Supreme Court decisions, ATS cases faced significant 
challenges and were dismissed for a number of different reasons,102 
the corporate veil among them.103  In Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co.,104 
for instance, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of an 
agency relationship between Coca Cola USA and Coca Cola 
Colombia, its wholly owned subsidiary, and thus rejected the claim 
against the American company.  Although the jurisdictional veil is 
now the most significant hurdle for plaintiffs, the focus on the 
wrongful actions of the U.S.-based parent company that the 
Supreme Court decisions require brings to the fore corporate veil 
questions as well, in particular how the parent company can be held 
liable in a given case.  As with the direct liability line of cases, the 
parent’s contribution to the overseas harm is under the spotlight. 
Before looking at the question of attributing liability to the parent 
company, the next section will track conventional tort litigation of 
business and human rights claims in the United States, the parallel 
trend to ATS litigation. 
 




 101 This was a reversal of the Trump administration’s earlier position on this 
issue.  See William S. Dodge, Trump Administration Reverses Position on Corporate 
Liability Under Alien Tort Statute, JUST SEC. (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/70512/trump-administration-reverses-position-on-
corporate-liability-under-alien-tort-statute [https://perma.cc/2QEC-6CA7]. 
 102 David Nersessian describes how some cases were dismissed for reasons 
related to the jurisdictional veil, such as judicial comity.  DAVID NERSESSIAN, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 112 (2016) (“Comity 
encompasses ‘the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the 
resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.’” 
(citing Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 
543 n. 27 (1987))). 
 103 Skinner, supra note 42, at 1804 n.120 (listing a number of such cases). 
 104 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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b. Conventional Tort Litigation 
Since the 1990s, a number of conventional tort claims based on 
transitory tort theory105 have been brought before the U.S. federal 
and occasionally state courts against parent companies, seeking to 
attribute liability to them for harm that has occurred overseas 
through the operations of their subsidiaries.  One of the earliest cases 
was the Bhopal litigation introduced above.106  The number of 
conventional tort claims increased with the ascendency of the ATS, 
as ATS cases routinely include parallel state law claims in the federal 
courts.107  Plaintiffs also sometimes present state law claims parallel 
to ATS litigation, but in state courts.  In Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,108  
discussed above,109 the plaintiffs re-filed their pendent state law 
claim in the state court after the ATS claims were dismissed.  The 
case settled prior to the start of the state court trial.110  In another 
such case, the plaintiffs sought damages in tort law for personal 
injuries suffered as a result of Chevron/Texaco’s operations in the 
Niger Delta, in the federal court, in parallel with an ATS claim.111  In 
the period since the advent of ATS litigation against corporate 
defendants, conventional tort claims have also been filed without 
accompanying ATS claims,112 although this is a relatively infrequent 
occurrence.  Not nearly as visible as ATS litigation in the academic 
literature, certain scholars, including Svetlana Nagiel, have 
commented on this trend of conventional tort litigation against 
 
 105 See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in 
Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 83-87 (2013). 
 106 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 107 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 
2000) (arising from the same set of facts as Kiobel and alleging both state and foreign 
tort law violations); Jonathan Drimmer, Resurrection Ecology and the Evolution of the 
Corporate Alien Tort Movement, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 989 (2012) (discussing the birth and 
rise of the corporate ATS movement). 
 108 See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 109 See supra Part III.A. 
 110 Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law 
on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 14, 14 (2005). 
 111 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 22, 2006) (allowing Nigerian plaintiffs’ claim against Chevron for negligence 
and intentional torts relating to Chevron’s response to rebels’ taking of an oil 
platform in Nigeria to proceed to trial, which resulted in a jury verdict for the 
defendants). 
 112 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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corporate defendants. Nagiel argued that state statutory and 
common law causes of action were viable alternatives to the ATS for 
wrongs committed outside the United States.113 
With the restrictions placed on the use of the ATS in Kiobel, there 
was renewed interest among the academy in state common law tort 
claims as a vehicle for transnational business and human rights 
litigation.114  The predicted increase in conventional tort litigation of 
business and human rights cases in the wake of the Kiobel decision 
has not occurred, however.115  In fact, there are only isolated 
 
 113 Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel, Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim 
Compensation: How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights Claims, 46 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 133, 165 (2007); see also Drimmer, supra note 107, at 992-95 (recording 
the conventional tort litigation trend). 
 114 See generally Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights 
Cases under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013) (arguing that, 
as long as a state court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, that court 
would generally have jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of human rights 
violations in a foreign state and setting out various advantages and disadvantages 
of litigating in state courts as compared to federal claims litigated in federal courts); 
Alford, supra note 13 (arguing that the most likely avenue for plaintiffs post Kiobel 
would be pleading violations of state or foreign tort laws); Nora Mardirossian, 
Direct Parental Negligence Liability: An Expanding Means to Hold Parent Companies 
Accountable for the Human Rights Impacts of Their Foreign Subsidiaries 6 (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607592 [https://perma.cc/372P-DNE3] (“[R]eturning 
to this conventional tort litigation under state law may be a more viable option for 
victims seeking redress.”); Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, 
Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 744–49 
(2012) (analyzing issues of federalism, choice of law, preemption, and due process 
that the author predicts will arise as part of the post-ATS wave of transnational 
litigation in state courts); Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to 
Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational 
Corporations in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 200 
(2014) (arguing that the decision in Kiobel likely meant that many cases brought 
against businesses for their role in human rights abuses abroad would be brought 
under state law in either state courts or in federal courts under diversity 
jurisdiction).  On various aspects of the broad trend, see Symposium, Human Rights 
Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013).  
Introducing a non-U.S. perspective to the post Kiobel debate, Robert McCorquodale 
charted the foreign direct liability trend outside the United States and argued that 
this might reignite claims in the United States on non-ATS bases.  Robert 
McCorquodale, Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States, 107 AM. J. 
INT’L. L 846, 851 (2013). 
 115 The author surveyed the websites of the key civil society organizations that 
litigate corporate accountability cases.  These organizations are: Earthrights 
International, the Center for Constitutional Rights and the Center for Justice and 
Accountability.  The author used the Corporate Legal Accountability resources 
from the Business and Human Rights Resource Center website and legal databases 
Nexis Uni and HeinOnline. 
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examples of new conventional tort law cases,116 essentially a 
continuation of the pre Kiobel state of affairs.  The difference post 
Kiobel is that fewer ATS cases are being brought,117 meaning fewer 
opportunities for parallel conventional tort claims. 
As with ATS litigation, the hurdles for plaintiffs in conventional 
tort claims relate both to the corporate veil and the jurisdictional 
veil.  Looking first at conventional tort claims, a number of early 
examples from the 1990s prior to the advent of ATS litigation, 
including the Bhopal litigation introduced above, were dismissed by 
the courts on forum non conveniens grounds.118  Related to the 
jurisdictional veil, under this doctrine the court dismisses a case on 
the basis that another forum—usually the host state—is more 
“convenient” for the litigation.119  The corporate veil has featured as 
a reason for dismissal in more recent conventional tort cases.  One 
example is Gomez v. Dole Food Co., which was dismissed in 2012 
because of the plaintiffs’ failure to properly plead alter ego and to 
join Dole’s Colombian subsidiary, a necessary and proper party to 
the litigation.120  Another example is Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,121 
which concerns the contractual veil rather than the corporate veil.  
The plaintiffs presented four distinct legal theories to support their 
argument that Wal-Mart’s Standards for Suppliers and California 
common law provide substantive obligations that can be enforced 
by foreign workers in the Wal-Mart supply chain against Wal-Mart, 
including the negligent breach of duty to monitor suppliers and 
protect the plaintiffs from the suppliers’ working conditions.122  In 
dismissing the case, the court rejected all four theories. 
When conventional tort claims are brought alongside ATS 
claims, with some exceptions, their fate seems to be linked to that of 
 
 116 See, e.g., Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. 
Del. 2018), vacated and remanded, 765 F. App’x 811 (3d Cir. 2019); Kashef v. BNP 
Paribas S.A., 442 F. Supp. 3d 809 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).  Kashef is not about attributing 
liability to the parent company for its role in the wrongdoing of an affiliate 
company. 
 117 See supra note 114. 
 118 Drimmer, supra note 107, at 993 (citing Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 
F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 
1995)). 
 119 SKINNER, MCCORQUODALE & DE SCHUTTER, supra note 38, at 25. 
 120 No. B228876, 2011 WL 5085007, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2011). 
 121 572 F.3d 677, 683-84 (9th Cir. 2009).  See also Madeleine Conway, A New 
Duty of Care? Tort Liability from Voluntary Human Rights Due Diligence in Global 
Supply Chains, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 741, 774-77 (2015). 
 122 Walmart, 572 F.3d 677. 
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the ATS claim.  Only a few parallel claims remain intact post Kiobel 
and Jesner.  One such case is Doe I v. Exxon Mobile Corp., discussed 
above.  The ATS claims were dismissed in June 2019 but the 
conventional tort claims for wrongful death; battery; assault; 
arbitrary arrest, detention, and false imprisonment; and negligence 
remain.123  These claims are governed by Indonesian law.124  
Likewise in Doe v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., claims under the ATS 
were dismissed, leaving only claims under Colombian law, which 
were due to be heard in the Southern District Court of Florida in 
October 2019.125  Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, also discussed above, is 
on-going both as an ATS claim and under California state law.126  As 
noted there, the focus of court decisions thus far in this matter is the 
viability of the ATS claim.127  Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 
is on-going both under the ATS and as a conventional tort law claim, 
again the current focus of the courts being the viability of the ATS 
claim.128  In summary, there are only a few transnational business 
and human rights cases—both ATS and conventional tort law—
currently before the U.S. courts.  The difficulty attributing liability 
to parent corporations is one of the reasons such cases are dismissed. 
c. Overcoming the Corporate Veil 
As seen in the preceding sections, the corporate veil is a hurdle 
to plaintiffs in both ATS and conventional tort litigation.  There are 
two aspects to proving liability of the parent company in ATS 
litigation:  the first is imputing liability to the parent company when 
the wrongdoer is a subsidiary company, the second is proving the 
parent company liable as primary violator of customary 
international law norm, or under secondary liability concepts such 
as aiding and abetting.129  Imputing liability to the parent company, 
 
 123 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76, 78 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 124 Id.  This means that U.S. law on attributing liability to parent companies 
will not be applied. 
 125 No. CV 07-3406 (JMV), 2018 WL 497322 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2018). 
 126 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020). 
 127 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-30 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 128 Id.  This is also the position in Adhikari v. KBR Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017 
WL 4237923 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 25, 2017) (Adhikari II). 
 129 Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? 
Achilles’ Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227, 241 
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the focus here, can be achieved in different ways: piercing the 
corporate veil; under agency theory; or under enterprise liability 
theory.130  There is no clear precedent on whether state law or federal 
common law applies to determine derivative liability by which the 
faults of the subsidiary can be attributed to the parent in ATS 
litigation, however.131  In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., a key 
precedent in this field, the judge applied federal common law.132  
Likewise in the Unocal litigation, discussed above, federal common 
law was applied to determine the question of attributing liability to 
the U.S. parent corporation.133  In contrast, in Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.134 the district court judge applied the 
conflicts of law regime of the forum, New York, to determine which 
state’s law would apply to the question of piercing the corporate 
veil.135  The situation is more straightforward when conventional 
tort claims are litigated in state courts, because plaintiffs have only 
one of these challenges:  to impute liability to the parent company.  
The law that will be applied to determine parent company liability 
may be that of the state where suit is brought or, depending on the 
conflicts of law of the forum, foreign law.  Assuming U.S. law 
applies, the parent company can be made liable by piercing the 
corporate veil under agency theory or under enterprise liability 
theory. 
 
(2011).  The test for accessory liability (aiding and abetting) under the ATS has been 
approached in different ways by different circuits.  The first question is whether the 
law to apply to determine accessory liability is international law or federal common 
law.  There is now settled case law establishing that international law is applicable.  
See Srish Khakurel, The Circuit Split on Mens Rea for Aiding and Abetting Liability 
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 59 B.C.L. REV. 2953, 2966 (2018). 
 130 The third, enterprise liability, is advocated by certain scholars; for example, 
Meredith Dearborn argued that enterprise liability should be reconsidered for torts 
committed by corporate groups.  Meredith Dearborn, Enterprise Liability: Reviewing 
and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CAL. L. REV. 195 (2009); see also 
Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law 
Reach Human Rights? 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 101 (2013).   
 131 SIMON BAUGHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORPORATE WRONGS: CLOSING THE 
GOVERNANCE GAP 155-56 (2015). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 156.  Federal common law was also applied in In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 134 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 135 BAUGHEN, supra note 131, at 156. 
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d. Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp. 
A recent case, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp.,136 is 
emblematic of the approach adopted by plaintiffs to attribute 
liability to parent companies in transnational business and human 
rights litigation.  This is a rare example in such litigation of plaintiffs 
suing the American parent corporation in tort law in the federal 
court, with no parallel ATS claim.  It is relevant to this Article 
because the plaintiffs seek to attribute liability to the parent 
company for wrongdoing ostensibly at the hands of the 
subsidiary.137  The plaintiffs are subsistence farmers who live in the 
rural highlands of Cajamarca, Peru.  The plot of land where they 
have cultivated crops and raised livestock for over 20 years, called 
Tragadero Grande, is claimed by the corporation as part of the site 
of a planned gold mine.  The plaintiffs allege that the corporation 
has instituted a campaign of harassment against them since 2011 in 
an attempt to oust them from Tragadero Grande.  Specific 
allegations against the company and its security contractors include 
intimidation, assault, surveillance, trespass, and unlawful 
detainment.138 
The plaintiffs have sued the American parent company, 
Newmont Mining Corp., and three of its American subsidiaries.  The 
Newmont subsidiary operating the mine in Peru, a company called 
Minera Yanacocha (“M.Y.”), is not a defendant in the proceedings.  
Security at the planned Conga mine site was provided via a contract 
between M.Y. and Swedish firm Securitas, and via a memorandum 
of understanding between M.Y. and the Peruvian National Police.139  
The plaintiffs assert that security operations were carried out with 
the full approval and knowledge of the Newmont Mining Corp. by 
showing, for instance, how employees that control the security 
procedures of M.Y. are current or former employees of the parent 
 
 136 No. 17-1315, 2020 WL 1154783 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2020). 
 137 In Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2019), the allegations 
are made directly against the parent company as well as against a subsidiary 
company. 
 138 The formal charges are battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, intrusion on plaintiff’s physical solitude, negligence, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, trespass to chattels, and conversion.  See Complaint for Damages 
and Equitable Relief at 79-89, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. 
Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2017) (No. 17-1315). 
 139 Id. ¶¶ 183-211. 
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company.140  They therefore assert liability against the parent 
company primarily by attempting to show that M.Y. is its agent, and 
that the alleged torts were within the course and scope of the 
agency.141  As an alternative line of argument, which is far less 
developed in the case papers, the plaintiffs make an allegation that 
resembles “direct liability” used in the common law jurisdiction 
cases:  they allege that the defendants are directly liable for negligent 
supervision of mine security.142 
These arguments have not yet been tested in court.  As 
commonly occurs in transnational tort litigation, the defendants 
challenged the plaintiffs’ decision to sue in the United States, 
arguing that Peru is the appropriate forum for the case to be heard.   
The most recent decision in the litigation is that of the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which ruled that the case should be heard in 
Peru.143  The arguments deployed in the Acuña-Atalaya litigation are 
illustrative of the approach adopted by plaintiffs to attribute liability 
to parent companies in transnational business and human rights 
litigation. 
i. Veil Piercing / Enterprise Liability 
The plaintiffs in Acuña-Atalaya argue that the Peruvian 
subsidiary, M.Y., is the corporate defendant’s alter ego, or in other 
words, that the corporate veil should be pierced.144  Piercing the 
corporate veil is very difficult to achieve in practice, essentially 
requiring an extremely high degree of control over the activities of 
the subsidiary such that the subsidiary has no separate identity of 
its own.145  In the key precedent on this question, Bowoto v. Chevron 
 
 140 Id. ¶ 212-20. 
 141 Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10-11, Acuña-
Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2017) (No. 17-1315) 
[hereinafter Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion]. 
 142 Id. at 18. 
 143 Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp, No. 20-1765 (3d Cir. filed Dec. 
11, 2020); see also Kate Fried, U.S. Federal Appeals Court Rules that Maxima Acuña 
Atalaya’s Case Against Newmont Mining Corporation Should be Heard in Peru, 
EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 14, 2020), https://earthrights.org/media/u-s-
federal-appeals-court-rules-that-maxima-acuna-atalayas-case-against-newmont-m
ining-corporation-should-be-heard-in-peru/ [https://perma.cc/BN3G-Y4TJ]. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Blumberg, supra note 39, at 304-07; see generally supra Part II (discussing 
the corporate veil). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
548 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
Texaco Corp., the allegation was that Chevron’s Nigerian subsidiary, 
Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL), recruited the Nigerian military and 
police to fire on protesters on an oil platform, and provided them 
with transportation from which they launched this and a second 
attack on a Nigerian village.146  The issue before the court was 
whether the parent company could be liable for the acts of its 
subsidiary.  The judge held that the alter ego theory did not apply 
on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs could not 
show that the subsidiary was a mere instrumentality of the parent 
company.147  Reflecting the challenge of piercing the corporate veil, 
the plaintiffs in Acuña-Atalaya argue alter ego as an alternative to 
their primary argument, agency, and do not expand on their 
argument in their brief in support of a preliminary injunction, 
focusing their efforts for this application on agency only.148  Likewise 
the plaintiffs argue enterprise theory as an alternative means of 
attributing liability to the parent company, but do not expand on 
this argument in their motion in support of a preliminary injunction, 
reflecting how difficult it is to successfully use enterprise theory in 
practice.149 
ii. Agency 
As noted above, a parent company may be found liable in a 
transnational business and human rights claim where its subsidiary 
is found to have acted as its agent in respect of the particular action 
giving rise to the claim.150  The test for agency does not require the 
court to disregard the formalities of the corporate veil but instead, 
through vicarious liability, the principal or employer is held strictly 
liable for the acts or omissions of its agents that were within the 
course and scope of the agency.  In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 
the judge, in addition to holding that the alter ego theory did not 
apply, considered the question of agency.151  To support a finding of 
 
 146 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 147 Id. at 1246-47. 
 148 Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 141, at 10-17. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See generally Ma Ji, Multinational Enterprises’ Liability for the Acts of Their 
Offshore Subsidiaries: The Aftermath of Kiobel and Daimler, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 
397 (2015) (discussing agency in the transnational business and human rights 
litigation context). 
 151 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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agency, the judge found there must be “a close relationship or 
domination between parent and subsidiary.”152  The act for which 
liability is sought must be within the scope of the subsidiary’s 
authority as agent.  The court in Bowoto found evidence to support a 
finding that the subsidiary, CNL, was Chevron’s agent, including  
communications suggesting a close relationship regarding security, 
the parent setting security policies, the parent and subsidiary 
sharing officers and directors, the subsidiary’s importance to the 
parent; and the parent holding the subsidiary out to be a department 
of its own business.153  These last factors can be summarized in the 
question:  had the subsidiary engaged in activities which, but for the 
subsidiary, the parent would have had to undertake itself?  On the 
basis of these facts, the court allowed the plaintiffs’ claim against 
Chevron for negligence and intentional torts to proceed to trial, 
which resulted in a jury verdict for the defendants.154  In Doe I v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., it was similarly held that a jury could conclude 
that a subsidiary was the agent of its parent with regard to security 
for the subsidiary’s project, where the parent “exerted significant 
control over [the subsidiary’s] security, particularly through [the 
parent’s] Global Security Division.”155 
The plaintiffs in Acuña-Atalaya argue that M.Y. is Newmont 
Mining Corp.’s agent “at least for security purposes, including 
dealing with the [p]laintiffs.”156  They support this argument with 
evidence showing an overlap of personnel between the companies; 
the parent company setting standards and policies for M.Y., 
including on human rights and security; and parent company 
control of security via a group-wide security program and reporting 
structures.157  The defendant in Acuña-Atalaya argues that the 
relationship between parent and subsidiary is sufficient to establish 
agency only where the parent company dominates the activities of 
 
 152 Id. at 1239. 
 153 Id. at 1243. 
 154 Id. at 1250; Bowoto v. Chevron, EarthRights International, 
https://earthrights.org/case/bowoto-v-chevron-2/#documentsff69-1a905f26-
f4b6 [https://perma.cc/6JAL-G46Q]. 
 155 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2008).  The court allowed the Indonesian 
plaintiffs’ claims of wrongful death, theft by coercion, and assault and battery 
against Exxon relating to natural gas extraction activities in Indonesia to proceed to 
trial. 
 156 Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 141, at 16. 
 157 Id. at 16-17. 
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the subsidiary that relate to the claim.158  They deny that the 
plaintiffs have met the burden to establish such a relationship.159 
iii. Direct Parent Liability 
Direct parental negligence liability for harm caused by a 
subsidiary has yet to be established in U.S. case law.160  At least one 
leading scholar contends that the United States courts may at some 
point accept the direct liability argument in transnational tort 
litigation, implicitly clarifying that there is no reason in principle for 
courts not to do so.161  There has however been one occasion on 
which the Supreme Court laid out an opportunity for parents to be 
directly liable under the terms of a specific statute:  the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, known as CERCLA.162  This was a domestic case. 
Proceedings were brought under the Act against CP International 
Inc. in respect of the activities of its then defunct subsidiary, Ott 
Chemical Co.163  The suit was for the costs of cleaning up industrial 
waste generated by the Ott Chemical Co. plant.164  The Act allowed 
suit to be brought against “any person who at the time of disposal 
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which 
hazardous substances were disposed of . . . .”165  The question for the 
Court was whether the paper company operated the Ott Chemical 
Co. plant for the purpose of the Act.166 
 
 158 Answering Brief of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 16, Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. 
Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 2017) (No. 17-1315). 
 159 Id. at 17. 
 160 Mardirossian, supra note 114, at 5. 
 161 Vivian Grosswald Curran argues, “[w]hen they consider arguments 
rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, in expanding agency theory 
with respect to foreign subsidiaries, and in creating a direct duty of care theory, U.S. 
judges may also be more likely to take greater note of Canadian decisions such as 
HudBay and Vedanta . . . .”  Curran, supra note 57, at 443.   
 162 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64-73 (1998) (discussing parent 
liability under CERCLA). 
 163 Id. at 51. 
 164 Id. at 55. 
 165 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2018). 
 166 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 60. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/1
2021] Parent Company Direct Liability 551 
The Supreme Court held that a parent corporation could not be 
found liable under CERCLA for a subsidiary’s environmental 
practices merely on account of its active involvement in the 
subsidiary’s general affairs.167  But the parent could be found 
directly liable as an “operator” based on its management, direction, 
or conduct specifically related to pollution at the facility for instance 
when joint officers conducted the affairs of the subsidiary on behalf 
of the parent.168  Based on this finding, the Court remanded the case 
to the lower courts for re-evaluation and resolution.169  It is 
noteworthy that the Supreme Court’s approach was to focus on 
positive involvement by the parent company in the harmful activity 
of the subsidiary that goes beyond established norms of corporate 
behavior.170  Thus, as will be demonstrated below, it differs 
considerably from the approach to direct liability in English law. 
Ashton Philips argues that there has been one instance of direct 
parent company liability in tort litigation, a case from Illinois in 
which a parent company was held to be directly liable to the 
employees of its subsidiary when budgetary restrictions imposed by 
the parent left the subsidiary exposed to health and safety risks, 
which materialized in the form of a factory fire.171  The Supreme 
Court of Illinois held that “it is ‘axiomatic that every person owes to 
all others a duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury 
which naturally flows as a reasonably probable and foreseeable 
consequence of his act.’”172  Therefore, the parent company could be 
liable as a “direct participant” for any injuries caused by its 
affirmative mismanagement.173  A subsequent decision of the 
Superior Court of Massachusetts disapproved of this decision, 
however, doubting whether the Illinois court had correctly applied 
 
 167 Id. at 60-64. 
 168 Id. at 66-67. 
 169 Id. at 73. 
 170 BAUGHEN, supra note 131, at 162. 
 171 Ashton S. Phillips, Transnational Businesses, the Right to Safe Working 
Conditions, and the Rana Plaza Building Collapse: Toward a Tort-Based Solution to the 
Global Race to the Bottom, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING 
FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 468, 484-485 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2016) 
(citing Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 274, 278, 864 N.E.2d 227, 231 (2007)). 
 172 Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 238 (Ill. 2007) (citing Frye v. 
Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E. 2d 557 (1992)). 
 173 Id. at 235. 
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Bestfoods in adopting its theory of direct participant liability.174  As 
Phillips acknowledges, the Ninth Circuit also reached a conflicting 
result in the case of Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,175 discussed above.  
As noted there, this case differs from the cases discussed so far in 
that it concerns attributing liability to a lead company for harm to 
the plaintiffs caused by a supplier, not by a subsidiary.  The legal 
principles that apply are arguably similar, however.176  The plaintiffs 
alleged common law negligence, relating to Wal-Mart’s inadequate 
monitoring of its subcontractors’ factories.  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the negligence claims on 
the ground that Wal-Mart “did not owe [p]laintiffs a common-law 
duty to monitor Wal-Mart’s suppliers or to prevent the alleged 
intentional mistreatment of plaintiffs by the suppliers.”177 
Direct liability is used to make a narrow argument in Acuña-
Atalaya.  The plaintiffs claim that liability attaches where the 
defendant is negligent in supervising an activity or in permitting, or 
failing to prevent, tortious conduct by persons “upon premises or 
with instrumentalities under the defendant’s control.”178  In essence, 
they say that the defendants oversaw and controlled security and 
knew about the ongoing intimidation at the proposed mine site yet 
failed to ensure that security personnel stopped harassing plaintiffs.  
The authority cited is Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in which the plaintiffs 
alleged that the subsidiary was directly liable for the negligent 
supervision of Indonesian security personnel, and that the parent 
company was liable for the acts of the subsidiary under various 
theories, including agency.179  The court in Exxon decided that a 
 
 174 Born v. Simonds Int’l, Corp., 200602483C, WL 5905396, at *5 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 30, 2009).  Courts in Illinois are following the Forsythe decision, however.  
See, e.g., Deatherage v. D Transp., Inc., 4 N.E.3d 1108 (Ill. 2013). 
 175 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Phillips, supra note 171, at 485. 
 176 See SHELDON LEADER, JANE WRIGHT & ANIL YILMAZ, LEGAL OPINION ON 
ENGLISH COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF TORT: JABIR AND OTHERS V KIK TEXTILIEN UND 
NON-FOOD GMBH (2015) [hereinafter LEGAL OPINION ON JABIR]. 
 177 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d at 683. 
 178 Acuña-Atalaya Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 141, at 18 (citing Doe 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
 179  
An employer conducting activity through servants or other agents is liable 
for negligent supervision if the employer is negligent or reckless (1) in 
giving improper or ambiguous orders or in failing to make proper 
regulations; (2) in the employment of improper persons or 
instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others; (3) in the 
supervision of the activity; or (4) in permitting, or failing to prevent, 
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reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the subsidiary was liable 
for negligent supervision, in addition to accepting the plaintiffs’ 
prima facie case on agency.  It therefore denied summary judgment 
on this allegation.180  The difference between Exxon and Acuña-
Atalaya is that the allegation of direct liability is against the parent 
company in Acuña-Atalaya, which is one step removed from the 
subsidiary that engaged the services of the security personnel.  Thus, 
this argument is potentially more difficult to sustain.  More broadly, 
this type of direct liability relates only to negligent supervision and 
requires a higher level of oversight and control over the relevant 
activity than the direct liability argument used in the English cases, 
discussed in the next Part. 
IV. ENGLISH CASES:  ON THE RISE 
This Part tracks the rise of transnational business and human 
rights litigation in England.  The case analysis demonstrates that the 
path of this litigation has not been smooth, with courts taking one 
step forward, and two steps back.  It is against this background that 
the U.K. Supreme Court’s decisions in Lungowe and Okpabi provide 
an important marker of the approach of the courts going forward, 
giving sanction at the highest level for the direct parent company 
liability to be understood through a wider lens than it has been in 
certain instances in the past. 
a. Background to the Tort Claims 
Since the late 1990s, a number of transnational business and 
human rights cases have been brought in the English High Court.  
With no statutory equivalent to the ATS, these cases have been based 
on the tort of negligence.  They seek to impose direct liability for 
 
negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not servants or 
agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities under the person’s 
control.   
Exxon Mobile Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citation omitted). 
 180 Id. at 30. 
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actions or omissions by the parent company in respect of harm 
committed abroad.181 
An English case with a similar fact pattern to Acuña-Atalaya, but 
in which direct liability was argued against the parent company, had 
a swift and positive outcome for the plaintiffs, in contrast to the 
outcome in Acuña-Atalaya.  This case, Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals 
PLC, was brought against a U.K.-parent company, Monterrico 
Metals, and its wholly owned Peruvian subsidiary, Rio Blanco 
Copper SA, concerning protests that took place in Peru about the 
company’s proposal to develop a copper mine there.182  The 
plaintiffs were 31 protesters and their family members who were 
hooded, bound, and detained over a period of days by members of 
the Peruvian National Police.183  Two women alleged that they were 
sexually assaulted.184  One protester died.185  The plaintiffs’ claims 
were for false imprisonment, trespass to the person (torture) and 
negligence.  They sought damages for the injuries inflicted upon 
them by Peruvian police officers,186 instigated and aided by the mine 
management.187  The plaintiffs’ contention was that officers of the 
company “ought to have intervened so as to have prevented the 
abuse of the [c]laimants’ human rights.”188  The parent company was 
said to have exercised “effective control over the management of 
 
 181 In one of the early cases, for example, Connelly v. RTZ Corp. PLC [1997] 
UKHL 30 (HL) (Eng.), a worker suffering from laryngeal cancer who had been 
employed at RTZ’s uranium mine in Namibia brought such a claim.  Id. ¶ 1.  He 
alleged that the England-based RTZ parent company took key strategic technical 
and policy decisions relating to the mine.  Id. ¶ 3.  In particular, he alleged that RTZ 
had devised the mine’s policy on health, safety and the environment and/or had 
advised the mine as to the contents of the policy.  Id.  Thus, the foundation of the 
plaintiff’s claim was that the parent company owed him a direct duty of care, 
independent of the duty of care owed to him by his employer.  This argument was 
met with approval by the courts.  Id. at 33.  The House of Lords accepted that there 
was an arguable case against the parent company, in a forum non conveniens 
judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor.  Id. ¶ 4.  The action failed, however, because it had 
been initiated outside the limitation period allowed by law.  Id. at 21, 33. 
 182 See generally Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB) 
(Eng.) (removing Rio Blanco SA as a defendant when it became clear to the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers that the absence of a treaty between Peru and the United 
Kingdom would make it difficult to enforce any English judicial decision.).  See 
Meeran, supra note 29. 
 183 Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB) ¶ 7 (Eng.) 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. ¶ 11. 
 188 Id. ¶ 8. 
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the” subsidiary and was therefore directly liable to the plaintiffs.189  
The litigation came before a judge in the context of an application 
for a freezing order to ensure that the company retained sufficient 
assets in the U.K. to meet its potential liabilities in the case.190  The 
application required the judge to consider whether the plaintiffs had 
made out a good arguable case against the parent company, on the 
basis of the parent company’s involvement described above.  The 
plaintiffs were successful,191 and the parties reached a financial 
settlement that concluded the litigation, shortly after this application 
was decided in the plaintiffs’ favor.192 
The decision in Chandler v. Cape PLC193 was an important legal 
milestone in the direct liability line of cases, albeit in a domestic case 
concerning U.K.-based parent and subsidiary companies.  This is the 
only English direct liability case to have been won by the plaintiffs 
following a full trial of the facts—all the other direct liability cases 
have been lost or settled after court decisions on jurisdiction.194  The 
trial judgment was subject to an appeal, and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed the lower court’s decision that, in appropriate 
circumstances, the law may impose a duty of care on a parent 
company in respect of its subsidiary’s employees.195  The court set 
out four indicia of the appropriate circumstances that establish the 
parent’s knowledge of the potential harm to the plaintiff and the 
subsidiary’s or its employees’ reliance on that knowledge for the 
employees’ protection, which together formed the basis of the 
parent’s duty of care.196  On the facts of the case, the court found that 
the parent had assumed responsibility towards the plaintiff in 
circumstances where the parent company had installed its asbestos 
production business at its subsidiary’s site and maintained a certain 
level of control over the business, through involvement in and 
influence over its subsidiary’s operations.197  This control was 
illustrated by the parent issuing instructions about company 
products; the parent placing requirements on the subsidiary that it 
 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. ¶ 28. 
 191 Id. ¶ 27. 
 192 Angela Lindt, Transnational Human Rights Litigation: A Means of 
Obtaining Effective Remedy Abroad?, J. Legal Anthropology, Dec. 2020, at 57. 
 193 Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA Civ. 525 (Eng.). 
 194 See id. ¶ 2. 
 195 Id. 80-81. 
 196 Id. ¶ 80. 
 197 Id. ¶ 79. 
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seek approval before incurring capital expenditures; the parent’s 
centralized product development process; and its common 
company policies.198  The finding of a direct duty of care on the 
parent company has been relied on as precedent in a series of 
subsequent cases, discussed next. 
b. The Current Wave of Litigation 
There has been a steadily growing trickle of tort cases against 
transnational corporations in the English courts, boosted by Chandler 
and also by legal developments at the European level.  In 2005, a 
decision of the European Court of Justice clarified that under the 
relevant European law,199 national courts of European states do not 
have the power to dismiss cases brought against European 
defendants on the grounds that a court of a non-European state 
would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action (i.e., 
on forum non conveniens grounds).200  Following this judgment, a 
handful of transnational business and human rights cases were 
brought in which, unable to avail themselves of the defense of forum 
non conveniens, corporate defendants did not challenge jurisdiction 
of the English courts, at least not over the English parent 
company.201  In these cases, both the English parent company and 
the foreign subsidiary were sued.  The joining of the foreign 
company as co-defendant in connected claims was also made 
possible under the relevant European law.202 
 
 198 Martin Petrin, Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v 
Cape PLC, 76 MODERN L. REV. 603, 612 (2013).  The judgment in a subsequent case, 
Thompson v. Renwick Group [2014] EWCA Civ. 635 (Eng.), confirmed that a 
plaintiff would have had to show that the parent company was better placed, 
through superior knowledge or expertise, to protect its subsidiary’s employees 
against the risk of injury that materialized.  In contrast, the parent company merely 
holding shares in the subsidiary did not satisfy the test. 
 199 Brussels Regulation, supra note 51. 
 200 Owusu v. Jackson [2005] ECR 1383 (Eng.).  This position is now changed 
since the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.  See Ekaterina Aristova, 
The Future of Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations in the English Courts: Is 
For [Non] Conveniens Back?, BUS. HUM. RTS. J., May 21, 2021, at 1.  
 201 See, e.g., Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB) 
(Eng.); Bodo Cmty. v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria [2014] EWHC 958 (TCC) 
(Eng.); Kesabo v. African Barrick Gold PLC [2013] EWHC 3198 (QB) (Eng.). 
 202 Brussels Regulation, supra note 51, art. 8.  Member states’ domestic laws 
apply when the defendant corporation in the connected claim is domiciled outside 
the European Union. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/1
2021] Parent Company Direct Liability 557 
Then came a shift in tactics. Corporate defendants began to 
challenge jurisdiction by arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs in 
these cases did not have an arguable case against the domestically 
domiciled corporate defendant (usually the parent company) also 
known as the “anchor defendant” (because this defendant anchors 
the claim in the jurisdiction).  The test for jurisdiction over the parent 
company is premised on there being “between the claimant and the 
defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try.”203  
A “real issue to be tried” equates to an arguable case.  The arguable 
case that the plaintiffs have sought to establish is of direct liability 
of the domestic defendant.  A trilogy of recent cases illustrates the 
different approaches the courts have taken when they identify 
features relevant to deciding whether a parent company owes a duty 
of care to the plaintiffs, and thus whether there is an arguable case 
against the domestic defendant.204  These cases represent the cutting 
edge of the law on direct parent liability.  Although the applicable 
law in each of these cases is the law of the jurisdiction where the 
harm occurred (Zambia, Nigeria, and Kenya respectively), the 
relevant countries are common law jurisdictions, which draw on 
foreign law as precedent, including English law, in novel cases such 
as these. When viewed as a trilogy, the importance of Lungowe, the 
case discussed first, becomes apparent. 
i. Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC 
This case concerns the impact of pollution from a copper mine 
in Zambia that is operated by Konkola Copper Mines (“KCM”), the 
Zambian subsidiary of U.K.-parent company Vedanta Resources.  
The plaintiffs, 1,826 Zambian citizens, allege that they have suffered 
personal injury, damage to property, loss of income, and loss of 
amenity and enjoyment of land arising out of the operation of the 
 
 203 U.K. Ministry of Justice, Practice Direction 6B—Service Out of Jurisdiction 
§ 3.1(3)(a).  If there is a “real issue . . . for the court to try” the plaintiffs must still 
overcome the forum non conveniens hurdle in relation to the foreign subsidiary, but 
the fact that there is a properly pleaded case against the parent company domiciled 
in the jurisdiction is indicative that England is the appropriate forum.  Id., Vedanta 
Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 13 (Eng.).  The precedent on forum 
non conveniens is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 204 See Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 13 (Eng.); 
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 (Eng.); AAA v. Unilever PLC 
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532 (Eng.). 
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mine.205  They make a direct claim of negligence against Vedanta, 
alleging that it breached the duty of care it owed them to ensure that 
KCM’s mining operations did not cause harm to the environment or 
local communities.206  They also claim against KCM.207 
To establish Vedanta’s direct liability, the plaintiffs had to 
demonstrate that they had an arguable case that Vedanta owed a 
duty of care to affected local communities in the area of the mine, 
and that they breached this duty through their actions and/or 
omissions.  Such a duty of care has only been established once at 
trial, in Chandler, discussed above.  The judge’s conclusion that the 
plaintiffs in Lungowe had established an arguable case of Vedanta’s 
direct liability was premised on four pieces of evidence:  Vedanta’s 
sustainability report; the management agreement between Vedanta 
and KCM; a decision of an Irish court about the structure of the 
Vedanta corporate group; and the witness statement of a former 
KCM employee (a whistle-blower).208  These pointed towards there 
being a duty of care between the parent company and the 
plaintiffs.209 
After the company appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of 
Appeal,210 the case reached the U.K. Supreme Court in January 
2019.211  The company sought to persuade the court that finding a 
duty of care on the part of the parent company would involve a 
novel extension of common law tort, beyond the boundaries of any 
established category.212  The court disagreed.  Giving judgment, 
Lord Briggs held that the critical question determining whether 
there was an arguable case against Vedanta, was “whether Vedanta 
sufficiently intervened in the management of the Mine owned by its 
 
 205 See Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC [2016] EWHC 975, ¶ 1 (TCC) 
(Eng.). 
 206 Id. ¶ 3. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. ¶ 119. 
 209 See Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) (Eng.) (applying 
the test for determining new tortious duties of care).  “Proximity” is one of the tests 
from Caparo Industries for determining new tortious duties of care.  The Supreme 
Court disapproved of this approach on appeal, however, finding that it was not a 
new tortious duty of care that the plaintiffs sought to establish.  See Vedanta 
Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 60 (Eng.). 
 210 Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources PLC [2017] EWCA Civ. 1528 (Eng.).  See 
also Ekaterina Aristova, Tort Litigation against Transnational Corporations in the 
English Courts: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, UTRECHT L. REV., June 2018, at 6 (tracing 
the life of the case). 
 211 Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (Eng.). 
 212 Id. ¶ 46.   
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subsidiary KCM to have incurred, itself (rather than by vicarious 
liability), a common law duty of care to the [plaintiffs].”213  There 
was “nothing special or conclusive about the bare parent/subsidiary 
relationship”214—“the general principles which determine whether 
A owes a duty of care to C in respect of the actions of B are not novel 
at all.”215 
The court made it clear that the four indicia from Chandler must 
not be used formulaically to determine if there is a duty of care.216  
Taking a more pragmatic approach to the arrangements of 
multinational corporate groups, it noted that “[t]here is no limit to 
the models of management and control which may be put in place 
within a multinational group of companies.”217  “Everything 
depends on the extent to which, and the way in which, the parent 
availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, control, 
supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations . . . 
of the subsidiary.”218  This is important because one of the other 
cases in the trilogy (AAA v. Unilever) failed on the basis that the 
plaintiffs could not convincingly make a case on the facts that the 
parent company exercised sufficient control and that the foreign 
subsidiary relied on that control.219  The careful use of the 
terminology of “intervention” rather than “control” in Lungowe is 
striking.220 
Lord Briggs did not conduct the factual analysis of whether 
sufficient intervention had taken place, which had already been 
done by the lower court.  He noted however that had he done so, the 
parent company’s published materials, such as its sustainability 
report asserting its responsibility for laying down and 
implementing standards of environmental control at the mine, were 
“sufficient on their own to show that it is well arguable that a 
sufficient level of intervention by Vedanta in the conduct of 
operations at the Mine may be demonstrable at trial.”221  The 
 
 213 Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 44 (Eng.). 
 214 Id. ¶ 54. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. ¶¶ 59-60. 
 217 Id. ¶ 51.  The approach adopted in Okpabi and AAA, discussed below, of 
categorizing the kind of case in which the parent might incur a duty of care to third 
parties harmed by the activities of the subsidiary was not adopted in Lungowe.  Id. 
 218 Id. ¶ 49. 
 219 AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 1532, ¶ 40 (Eng.). 
 220 Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 59 (Eng.). 
 221 Id. ¶ 61. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
560 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:3 
defendants had sought to argue a general principle that a parent 
could never incur a duty of care in respect of the activities of a 
particular subsidiary merely by laying down group-wide policies 
and guidelines and expecting the management of each subsidiary to 
comply with them.  The court rejected this argument: 
 
[T]he parent may incur the relevant responsibility to third 
parties if, in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising 
that degree of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if 
it does not in fact do so.  In such circumstances its very omission 
may constitute the abdication of a responsibility which it has 
publicly undertaken.222 
 
This represents an extension of Chandler to the situation where a 
company makes representations about supervision of its subsidiary 
but omits to act on them.223  It also attributes a new legal significance 
to the content of group-wide policies and reports.  Almost two years 
after the Supreme Court judgment, the litigation ended with a 
settlement agreement being reached between the parties.224 
ii. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC 
Okpabi and its companion case are parallel claims brought on 
behalf of the inhabitants of two communities:  the Ogale Community 
and the Bille Kingdom in Ogoniland, Nigeria, which consists of 
around 40,000 people.225  Over several years there have been 
repeated oil spills from Shell’s pipelines in Ogoniland, many of 
which have not been cleaned up.226  The plaintiffs seek 
compensation through their suit for “damages arising as a result of 
serious and ongoing pollution and environmental damage caused 
 
 222 Id. ¶ 53. 
 223 See Robert McCorquodale, Vedanta v. Lungowe Symposium: Duty of Care of 
Parent Companies, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 18, 2019), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/18/symposium-duty-of-care-of-parent-companie
s/ [https://perma.cc/LXF2-6DQG]. 
 224 Legal Claim by More than 2,500 Zambian Villagers in a Case Against Vedanta 
Resources Limited, LEIGH DAY (Jan. 19, 2021) https://www.leighday.co.uk/latest-
updates/news/2021-news/legal-claim-by-more-than-2-500-zambian-villagers-in-
a-case-against-vedanta-resources-limited/ [https://perma.cc/7C36-VHW6]. 
 225 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, ¶ 2-4 (Eng.). 
 226 Id. ¶ 2. 
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by oil spills emanating from the Defendants’ oil pipelines and 
associated infrastructure.”227 The losses suffered include damage to 
land, and injury to livelihood and health.228  The case against the 
U.K.-registered Royal Dutch Shell PLC (“RDS”) is based on the 
common law of negligence and asserts that RDS breached its duty 
of care to ensure that its subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria (“SPDC”)’s operations in the Niger Delta did 
not cause harm to the environment and their communities.229  
Negligent management is alleged both in relation to maintenance of 
the pipeline and facilities to acceptable standards, and to taking 
effective measures to protect them from interference by third 
parties.230  This interference took the form of unlawful siphoning of 
oil by third parties incurring damage to the pipeline and other 
facilities, and consequential oil spills.231  Shell challenged the 
jurisdiction of the English courts to hear the case, and the matter 
came for a preliminary hearing before the High Court.232  The judge 
presiding ruled that the case could not proceed.233  As with Lungowe, 
the plaintiffs needed an arguable case against the U.K.-registered 
parent company, in order to be able to bring proceedings against 
both it and its subsidiary, SPDC, in the English courts.  This is 
because RDS is the so-called “anchor defendant” (the defendant 
domiciled in the jurisdiction). 
The High Court’s decision that there was not an arguable case 
was taken against the background to this litigation of RDS having 
distanced itself from the operational side of oil production.  This 
occurred through a restructure in 2005, which made RDS “the 
ultimate holding company of the Shell group of companies.”234  The 
High Court judgment was upheld on appeal in a split decision of the 
Court of Appeal.235  The majority held that the plaintiffs had not 
established an arguable case that RDS had a duty of care to the 
Nigerian communities affected by the pipeline.236  The available 
evidence, which at that preliminary stage of the proceedings prior 
 
 227 Id. (citing the particulars of the claim). 
 228 Id. ¶ 16. 
 229 Id. ¶ 3.  There are related claims made against the subsidiary, SPDC.  Id. 
 230 Id. ¶ 98. 
 231 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, ¶ 137 (Eng.).  
 232 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2017] EWHC (TCC) 89, ¶ 6 (Eng.). 
 233 Id. ¶ 122. 
 234 Id. ¶ 83. 
 235 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, ¶ 137 (Eng.).  
 236 Id. ¶ 132.  
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to discovery was mostly limited to publicly available information 
including group-wide policies,237 did not demonstrate the required 
control over SPDC.238 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.  Overruling the 
Court of Appeal in a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court 
strongly affirmed its decision in Lungowe.239  According to the 
Supreme Court judgment, the Court of Appeal majority’s focus on 
the parent’s control over the subsidiary, SPDC, was inappropriate.  
Citing Lungowe, the court held:  
 
The issue is the extent to which the parent did take over or share 
with the subsidiary the management of the relevant activity 
(here the pipeline operation).  That may or may not be 
demonstrated by the parent controlling the subsidiary.  In a 
sense, all parents control their subsidiaries.  That control gives 
the parent the opportunity to get involved in management.  But 
control of a company and de facto management of part of its 
activities are two different things.  A subsidiary may maintain 
de jure control of its activities, but nonetheless delegate de facto 
management of part of them to emissaries of its parent.240 
 
The Court noted that the internal documents that the plaintiffs 
would need to demonstrate the role of RDS in managing the SPDC 
pipeline operation at trial had not been discoverable at this point in 
proceedings.241  Two documents that had been acquired by the 
plaintiffs from a third party, the RDS Control Framework and the 
RDS Health, Security, Safety and Environment Control Framework, 
contained important information about operational organization 
within the Shell group of companies.  The Court was concerned that:  
 
The production of [these two documents] for the appeal hearing 
illustrate the danger of seeking summarily to determine issues 
 
 237 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3, ¶ 136 (Eng.). 
 238 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [20180 EWCA (Civ) 191, ¶ 122 (Eng.). 
 239 Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2021] UKSC 3 (Eng.); see also Ekaterina 
Aristova & Carlos Lopez, UK Okpabi et al v Shell: UK Supreme Court Reaffirms Parent 
Companies May Owe a Duty of Care Towards Communities Impacted by their Subsidiaries 
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which arise in parent/subsidiary cases such as this without 
disclosure.  Both are clearly material documents.  Had there 
been no appeal, the appellants’ claim would have been 
dismissed without consideration of either of them.242 
  
The Court’s emphasis on the need to consider the full body of 
evidence on the parent’s involvement in the harmful activities, 
rather than dismissing cases summarily, is welcomed. 
iii. AAA v. Unilever PLC 
The facts of the AAA case are quite different to those of the other 
two cases in the trilogy, and not typical for transnational business 
and human rights claims.  After the Kenyan presidential election in 
2007, there was a wave of violence throughout the country.243  Riots 
spread onto a tea plantation owned by one of Unilever’s 
subsidiaries, Unilever Tea Kenya Ltd. (“UTKL”).244  The rioters 
committed a number of atrocities there including rape and 
murder.245  The plaintiffs are tea plantation workers who fell victim 
to these violent acts, and family members of workers who were 
killed during the incident.246  They sued Unilever and UTKL in 
England, where Unilever is registered, alleging that the former, as 
anchor defendant owed them a duty of care and breached that duty 
by failing to put in place adequate crisis management policies.247  On 
the question whether Unilever owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs, 
the trial judge in the High Court found that the damage that 
occurred on the tea plantation was not foreseeable by either 
Unilever or UTKL.248  Foreseeability is one element of the test for a 
duty of care in a novel situation.249  Another element, proximity, was 
found to be present and Unilever’s corporate structure was 
distinguishable from that of Shell.250 
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The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision on 
foreseeability but overturned the decision on proximity, finding that 
there was no proximity between the plaintiffs and Unilever.251  Lord 
Justice Sales wrote the only judgment for the court.  He identified 
two categories of cases where a parent company would owe a duty 
of care:  “(i) where the parent [company] has in substance taken over 
the management of the relevant activity of the subsidiary in place 
of . . . the subsidiary’s own management; or (ii) where the parent 
[company] has given relevant advice to the subsidiary about how it 
should manage a particular risk.”252  The latter was potentially 
applicable.  He examined the policies that the company had in place 
in respect of risk management and found that those provided by the 
parent company were high-level, generic documents which left the 
specifics to be established at the local level by the subsidiaries.253  
Riots like those that occurred in 2007 had not happened on the tea 
plantation before.  Unilever did not hold superior knowledge on 
local political or ethnic matters.254  For these reasons there was no 
proximity between the parties and the appeal was rejected.  The 
plaintiffs sought permission to appeal the decision to the Supreme 
Court, but permission was not granted, because the appeal did not 
meet the test of raising an arguable point of law of general public 
importance that ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.255  
c. Discussion of the Trilogy 
Determination of whether a parent company has sufficiently 
intervened in the operations of its subsidiary to have incurred a 
common law duty of care to the plaintiffs is a question both of law 
and of fact.  The Supreme Court in Lungowe approached the relevant 
legal and factual analysis less restrictively for plaintiffs than the 
Court of Appeal did in both Okpabi and Unilever, in which the 
formalities of the corporate structure prevailed.  When it 
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acknowledged the various ways in which parent companies exert 
management, supervision and control over subsidiaries and held 
that “[e]verything depends on the extent to which, and the way in 
which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, 
intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of the 
relevant operations of the subsidiary,” the Supreme Court in 
Lungowe was acknowledging that there are various levels of 
intervention that might suffice for the parent company to incur a 
duty of care to the plaintiffs.256  The parent advising the management 
of the relevant operations of the subsidiary is relatively 
commonplace, and undoubtedly easier for plaintiffs to prove, than 
the parent taking over or controlling the management of these 
operations.  The Lungowe judgment also specifies that when it comes 
to group-wide policies, failing to act in circumstances where the 
parent company holds itself out as acting may be sufficient to incur 
the relevant responsibility.257  Again, it may be easier for plaintiffs to 
prove that the parent company should have done something but did 
not, than to prove that the parent took over or controlled the 
subsidiary.   
This less restrictive approach is to be welcomed.  The Supreme 
Court took the opportunity in Okpabi to correct the Court of 
Appeal’s error in that case of requiring that the parent company 
control the subsidiary’s operations or have direct responsibility for 
practices or failures which are the subject of the claim, and to solidify 
its incremental expansion in direct parent company liability.  This 
was an important opportunity to clarify the law and its application 
to the case in light of the ruling in Lungowe.  There was no such 
opportunity in the Unilever case but, as noted by one commentator: 
 
It is plausible that, given the guidance of the Supreme Court in 
Vedanta, a first instance judge [in the Unilever case] might now 
approach the relevant legal and factual analysis around parent 
company liability less restrictively and consider that the 
relatively low jurisdictional bar was cleared.258 
 
The Court of Appeal in the Unilever case was plainly wrong to 
resolve the question of the parent company’s duty of care using the 
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test of proximity that is applied in novel cases:  this approach was 
rejected in both Lungowe259 and Okpabi.260  If Okpabi does not settle 
and goes to trial, the Supreme Court’s approach in Lungowe and 
Okpabi will be applied to the facts ascertained through discovery, 
providing greater elucidation of direct liability of parent 
companies.261  This process of elucidation has also occurred through 
the spread of the direct liability argument to other jurisdictions, the 
subject addressed next. 
V. DIRECT LIABILITY SPREADS TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
This Part identifies key trends in transnational business and 
human rights litigation from jurisdictions outside the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  The expansion of tort litigation through 
direct liability claims has been taken up in other common law 
jurisdictions, notably Canada and, to a lesser extent, Australia.  The 
application of English common law precedent to claims brought in 
civil law jurisdictions has transmitted the direct liability trend 
outside common law jurisdictions.  It is to these claims that this Part 
turns first. 
a. Civil Law Jurisdiction Cases in which English Common Law is the 
Applicable Law 
The application of English common law precedent to claims 
brought in civil law jurisdictions has occurred in a handful of 
transnational business and human rights cases.  In the Dutch case of 
Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC,262 the applicable law was Nigerian 
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 262 Rb’s Den Haag 30 januari 2013, JOR 2013, 162 m.nt. JF (Akpan/Royal Dutch 
Shell PLC) (Neth.); Hof’s Den Haag 18 december 2015, NJF 2013, 3857 m.nt. F.C.S. 
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law, which draws on English precedent.263  The facts in Akpan were 
similar to those in Okpabi:  the allegations concern oil spills and 
pollution in the Niger Delta and the defendant corporations are 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC (the Anglo-Dutch parent company)264 and 
Shell Petroleum and Development Company Ltd. (the Nigerian 
subsidiary).265  A major difference is that Akpan is not a class action 
like Okpabi, but rather three parallel claims brought by individual 
fishermen and Friends of the Earth (Netherlands).266  The suit alleges 
that the oil spills occurred due to a lack of maintenance of a wellhead 
and inadequate safety measures to prevent sabotage.267 
Notably Akpan was heard prior to the trilogy of English cases 
discussed in Part IV above.  At trial, the District Court of The Hague, 
applying Nigerian law and, by extension, English law, had to apply 
the principles from the case of Chandler v. Cape to the facts at hand.268  
Its decision was to dismiss the claim against parent company, 
RDS.269  The court decided that RDS was not engaged in the same 
business as SPDC, one of the indicia from Chandler of parent 
company direct liability, because it was not engaged in oil 
production in Nigeria like SPDC.270  Therefore, RDS was not 
expected to have better knowledge of how to prevent risks from 
harm caused by oil spills and pollution than SPDC, meaning that 
there was no proximity between the parties to ground a duty of 
care.271  The court therefore found no reason to depart from the 
principle in Nigerian and English tort law that there is no general 
duty of care to prevent others from suffering harm as a result of the 
activities of third parties.272  It did find for the plaintiffs against 
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SPDC, however, making this one of the only transnational business 
and human rights claims against a TNC to succeed at trial.273   
The Dutch court’s restrictive approach to proximity was later 
mirrored by the English courts in Okpabi.  Akpan is not legal 
precedent for the English courts, but it is certainly conceivable that 
the courts in Okpabi were aware of the Dutch litigation, not least 
because Shell is a defendant in both cases.  The Akpan plaintiffs 
appealed the District Court decision, and their appeal was 
successful.274  By this time, the Lungowe judgment had been issued 
by the U.K. Supreme Court, further elucidating the principles of 
direct parent company liability.  The court found a limited duty of 
care in relation to the parent company’s response to the spill.275  The 
judgment is in Dutch, but Lucas Roorda reports the following 
outcome: 
 
Based on internal documents, bonus policies and a witness 
statement, the court concludes that after 2010 RDS was actively 
trying to limit the amount of oil spills in SPDC’s operations, 
amongst other things by installing Leak Detection Systems 
(LDS) in its pipelines.  The court thus finds that with respect to 
the installation of an LDS in the Oruma pipeline, where it had 
not been installed at the time of the proceedings, RDS had a duty 
of care to the claimants.  It orders Shell to insure it is installed 
within a year.276  
 
Thus, this case is the first time that plaintiffs have established, 
following a full, merits trial, a common law duty of care on a parent 
company towards them.277  A further case concerning oil pollution 
in the Niger Delta is currently before the Italian courts.278  This is 
against a different corporate defendant:  the Italian oil company 
ENI.279  Nigerian law and, by extension, English common law is the 
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applicable law and the plaintiffs allege that the parent company is 
directly liable in negligence.280  Thus the Akpan litigation is not an 
isolated example. 
Another case in which English common law precedent has been 
applied in a civil law jurisdiction is Jabir v. KiK.281  A novel feature of 
this case that differentiates it from most of the cases discussed so far 
is that it concerns a first tier supplier, not a subsidiary.282  As noted 
above, when corporations’ overseas operations are conducted 
contractually through suppliers and licensees, the contractual veil 
operates to prevent plaintiffs attributing direct liability to the lead 
company.283  In Jabir, the plaintiffs attempted to persuade a German 
court that the direct liability precedent from Chandler applies when 
the relationship between the companies is one of contract rather 
than of equity.284  The plaintiffs are victims of a fire in a textile factory 
in Pakistan run by a Pakistani company called Ali Enterprises (A.E.), 
and the families of those who died in the fire.285  KiK is a German 
low-cost apparel retailer.286  A.E. produced almost exclusively for 
KiK.287  The allegation in the case is that many of the factory 
windows were barred, the emergency exits locked, and the building 
had only one unobstructed exit, impeding the exit of employees 
who, as a consequence, suffocated or were burned alive inside.288  
The factory had recently been the subject of a health and safety audit 
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by an Italian social auditing firm, acting on behalf of KiK.289  These 
safety problems were not identified.290  The plaintiffs sued the 
company in Germany for compensation for personal injury and 
death.291  Pakistani law, which is the applicable law in the case, is 
derived from the common law, meaning that English law precedent 
is used in novel cases.292 
A brief on the applicable law that was submitted to the German 
court argues that the case deals with the responsibilities of 
purchasers of goods from suppliers in situations in which there is 
not the arm’s length relationship characteristic of typical commercial 
situations.293  It alleges that KiK was in a position similar to that of 
the parent company in Chandler.  KiK  
had made a commitment to the health and safety policy to be 
followed by [A.E.]; [Kik] had enough potential influence 
over the supplier making it able to fully implement its 
standards had it wished to; [KiK] had, via its auditor, 
specialist knowledge of the criteria for distinguishing 
adequate from inadequate factory safety provisions which 
A.E. did not have; and [KiK] was in a line of business that 
overlapped with that of A.E. sufficiently to make it fair that 
its knowledge and experience should be brought to bear on 
the improvements294  
to safety that should have been made.  The joint effect of this 
superior knowledge of current safety criteria, taken together with its 
failure to intervene to rectify working conditions, created an 
environment in which A.E. relied on KiK’s guidance and was 
encouraged to continue its workplace practices due to the absence 
of pressure from KiK. 
The case did not reach trial however, meaning that these 
arguments on parent company liability were not fully considered in 
court.  Having been granted legal aid by the court on the basis of an 
arguable case,295 the court later dismissed the case because the 
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statute of limitation had expired.296  The outcome of the litigation 
was therefore reached on process rather than substance, and the 
plaintiffs have appealed.297 
b. Canadian Cases 
As a major global center for mining, Canada has been a key 
jurisdiction for claims against parent companies in this sector in 
which direct liability is alleged.  Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc.298 is 
one such case.  The allegation that lies behind this litigation is that 
the security personnel at Hudbay Minerals’ former mining project 
in Guatemala along with Guatemalan police and military engaged 
in numerous human rights abuses, including shooting, killing and 
rape, when evicting local people from a mine site.299  The security 
personnel were hired by Hudbay’s 98.2% owned subsidiary.300  The 
plaintiffs’ primary argument is an allegation that Hudbay owed a 
direct duty of care to them to prevent the harms in question.301  In 
the alternative, they seek to hold Hudbay liable by piercing the 
corporate veil.302 
The case has survived a preliminary challenge on the basis of 
forum non conveniens and a motion to dismiss on the merits of the 
claim.303  With regard to the allegation of direct negligence against 
the parent company, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had 
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sufficiently pleaded both foreseeability and proximity between the 
plaintiffs and defendants to found a novel claim such as this.304  The 
test for foreseeability is whether the harm was “a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act.”305  The plaintiffs 
argue inter alia that the company knew that the security forces 
frequently used violence to evict people and that this had happened 
at the proposed mine site on a previous occasion.306  These 
allegations of a high level of parent company knowledge were 
sufficient for the court to find foreseeability arguable.307  The test for 
proximity is “the circumstances of the relationship inhering between 
the plaintiff and the defendant are of such a nature that the 
defendant may be said to be under an obligation to be mindful of 
the plaintiff’s legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs.”308  
The court found that the allegations sufficiently alleged proximity.309  
These allegations included statements made by Hudbay asserting its 
direct involvement and its high level of operational oversight of the 
subsidiary and the security personnel, and that it did everything in 
its power to ensure the evictions were carried out in accordance with 
human rights.310  The court granted Amnesty International Canada 
intervener status in the litigation.311  Amnesty International cited the 
English case law discussed above to support its argument that 
parent company liability is not new to tort law, and that the 
imposition of a duty of care was therefore foreseeable to the 
corporate defendants.312  This argument, and the relevance of the 
English law precedent, will be considered at trial.313 
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In Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, the plaintiffs, three Eritrean 
refugees, claim, on behalf of themselves and more than 1,000 
Eritrean workers, that Nevsun is liable in negligence and for 
breaches of customary international law including forced labor, 
torture, slavery, and crimes against humanity.314  The claims relate 
to Nevsun’s alleged complicity in the use of forced labor at a mine 
site in Eritrea.315  The mine is jointly owned by Nevsun (60%) and 
the Eritrean state (40%).316  The Eritrean state drafted labor for the 
mine site using its National Service Program—a system known to 
amount to use of forced labor.317  An attempt by Nevsun to have the 
claims under customary international law struck out was 
unsuccessful, the court finding it at least arguable that customary 
international law forms part of Canada’s common law and rejecting 
the defendant’s defenses based on act of state and forum non 
conveniens.318  The decision as it related to customary international 
law and act of state was the subject of an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.  In a long-awaited judgment released in February 
2020, the court held by a majority of five to four that the claims based 
on customary international law could proceed.319  The majority 
concluded that under the “doctrine of adoption,” peremptory norms 
of customary international law are automatically adopted into 
Canadian domestic law,320 and the plaintiffs’ pleadings based on 
customary international law did not therefore “disclose no 
reasonable claim.”321  The significance of this ruling is that it opens 
up the possibility of enforcing customary international human 
rights law through the common law, making this case more like the 
old U.S. ATS cases than the new U.K. tort cases.  These cases, along 
with their counterparts in other common law countries,322 and the 
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cases in civil law jurisdictions described above, indicate that the U.K. 
precedent is being amplified in international jurisprudence. 
VI. DIRECT LIABILITY AS A PATH FORWARDS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, there are reasons 
to be cautiously optimistic for plaintiffs about the gradual expansion 
of direct liability in transnational business and human rights 
litigation in English case law.  The jurisdictional veil in cases against 
parent companies, still a significant hurdle for plaintiffs in U.S. 
courts, was diminished as an impediment for plaintiffs in the 
English cases as a result of developments at the European level.323  
This has placed the focus firmly on the corporate veil, and more 
specifically on attributing liability to the parent company.  Lungowe 
and Okpabi are clearly an important legal milestone for plaintiffs in 
tackling this hurdle.  To have two decisions from the U.K. Supreme 
Court on the subject within a two-year period is highly significant 
to the shaping of direct parent company liability.  With the use of 
English law precedent in some common law jurisdictions, and in the 
civil law jurisdiction cases described above, the significance of this 
case extends beyond England.  While wholesale reform of the 
corporate veil in transnational business and human rights litigation 
remains elusive, the incremental expansion of direct parent 
company liability offers a pragmatic way forward for plaintiffs. 
In contrast, the situation for plaintiffs in the United States is far 
more sanguine.  The outcome of Kiobel came as a blow to the 
corporate accountability movement.  Up until that point most, if not 
all, ATS cases against corporate defendants concerned harmful 
events that occurred overseas.  The decision in Kiobel that the 
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality 
apply to the ATS therefore represented a sea-change in the 
interpretation of the statute and, going forward, the touch and 
concern test presents an enormous hurdle to plaintiffs.  The closing 
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off of litigation against foreign corporations means that all aspects 
of culpable behavior—those of the parent and those of the 
subsidiary—cannot be examined in the same ATS case.  Of greater 
significance, corporate liability under international law, and 
consequently under the statute, is precarious, with a decision from 
the Supreme Court on this subject coming in 2021.324 
When it comes to attributing liability to the parent company in 
transnational business and human rights litigation, the test for 
agency—the primary argument used by plaintiffs seeking to 
attribute liability to parent companies in the United States—is more 
exacting for plaintiffs to prove than the direct liability test from the 
English line of cases.  While both tests involve an examination of the 
relationship between the parent company and the subsidiary, 
focusing in particular on their interaction over the activities that are 
the subject of the claim, agency requires that the parent company 
dominate the relevant activities, while direct liability considers more 
broadly the extent to which the parent company takes over, 
intervenes in, controls, supervises, or advises the management of the 
relevant operations.  Put simply, the former entails more parent 
company involvement than the latter.  The Lungowe judgment also 
provides that a duty of care may be imposed when, through group-
wide policies, the parent company holds itself out as supervising the 
subsidiary, but it omits to do so in practice.325  This is highly relevant 
in the context of global business, where expectations for the 
corporate group are communicated through group-wide policies on 
subjects such as security, health and safety, the environment, and 
human rights.  For example, in Acuña-Atalaya the parent company 
sets standards and provides policies for its subsidiary, including on 
human rights and security, and is alleged to have failed to ensure 
that these were followed.326  By attributing liability where a 
company holds itself out as supervising, but omits to do so in 
practice, direct liability could be the key to success for the plaintiffs 
in this case. 
Agency is a means by which the wrongs of the subsidiary can be 
visited upon the parent.  Direct liability, on the other hand, looks 
squarely at the parent company and attributes liability for its role in 
the wrongdoing of the subsidiary.  There is an important difference 
 
 324 Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, 141 S. Ct. 188 (2020) (cert. granted). 
 325 Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, ¶ 20 (Eng.); see also 
McCorquodale, supra note 223. 
 326 Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 812 (D. Del. 
2018), vacated and remanded, 765 F. App’x 811 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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here, in terms of framing the wrongdoing and locating the problem.  
It is not the subsidiary doing wrong overseas and the parent 
company being found liable for it, but the parent company’s acts and 
omissions, some of which occur at headquarter level, that are under 
scrutiny. 
What lessons can be taken from the positive U.K. experience?  At 
least one leading scholar contends that the U.S. courts may at some 
point accept the direct liability argument in transnational tort 
litigation, implicitly clarifying that there is no reason in principle for 
courts not to do so.327  Acceptance of the direct liability argument by 
the U.S. courts offers a path forward for transnational business and 
human rights litigation.  Not only is direct liability easier for 
plaintiffs to establish, diminishing one of the many hurdles that 
plaintiffs in such cases face, but using this argument also allows the 
courts to look more broadly at the interaction between a parent and 
subsidiary company and attribute liability for involvement that falls 
short of domination but is nonetheless culpable behavior on the 
parent’s part that plays a significant role in the subsidiary’s 
wrongdoing.  By examining the interaction between parent and 
subsidiary, and the parent and the victim, and focusing on the 
culpable actions/omissions that occurred at headquarter level, 
direct liability connects transnational business and human rights 
cases with the U.S. jurisdiction.  This provides a powerful argument 
to counter forum non conveniens, meaning that in cases like Acuña-
Atalaya, the courts are in better position to find a meaningful nexus 
between the United States and the decisions and practices that form 
the subject of the claim, and will be less likely therefore to dismiss 
on forum non conveniens grounds.  It also strengthens the argument 
that federal or state law is the applicable law in a given case,328 and 
is in keeping with the focus on domestic culpable conduct that the 
touch and concern test from Kiobel requires of ATS litigation. 
At a higher level, the English case law may go some way to 
assuage the U.S. courts’ fear, underpinning the decisions in Kiobel, 
Bauman, and Jesner, about jurisdictional overreach of the U.S. courts 
and, consequently, impact on foreign relations.  This applies to 
federal courts in ATS claims and federal or state courts in 
conventional tort claims.  It is clear from the direct liability line of 
cases that parent company home state courts outside the United 
 
 327 Curran, supra note 57, at 443. 
 328 See Alford, supra note 13 (discussing conflict of laws in transnational 
business and human rights litigation). 
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States are accepting jurisdiction over transnational business and 
human rights claims.  While not serving as precedent for the U.S. 
courts, these cases can nonetheless be used by plaintiff lawyers to 
evidence a global trend of provision of access to remedy in 
transboundary human rights cases in which the parent company is 
sufficiently involved in the operations of the subsidiary.  This trend 
can be linked to the commentary to the UNGPs,329 which tells states 
that they should provide access to remedy in extraterritorial cases 
when host state courts do not,330 and likewise to the General 
Comment of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
on this subject, which holds that the extraterritorial obligation to 
protect requires state parties to take steps to prevent and redress 
infringements of Covenant rights that occur outside their territories 
due to the activities of business entities over which they can exercise 
control, especially in cases where the remedies available to victims 
before the domestic courts of the state where the harm occurs are 
unavailable or ineffective.331 
 
 329 Note that the U.K. Supreme Court declined to reference international 
standards in Lungowe.  But see McCorquodale, supra note 223.  Such standards have 
been referenced in certain cases though.  See Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc., [2013] 
116 O.R. 3d 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (noting that Amnesty, an intervener in the 
case, argued that the UNGPs and other norms support the view that a duty of care 
may exist in circumstances where a parent company’s subsidiary is alleged to be 
involved in gross human rights abuses).  Amnesty also argued that, because the 
Canadian government endorsed the UNGPs, Canadian courts should have no 
difficulty in drawing upon them in considering whether a Canadian corporation 
owes a duty of care.  Id. ¶ 26. 
 330 UNGPs, supra note 58, Principle 26 and Commentary. 
 331 See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General 
Comment No 24, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (2017); see also Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14, ¶ 39, Docs. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (stating that in order to comply with their international 
obligations, state parties to ICESCR have to respect the enjoyment of the rights 
stipulated in the Covenant in other countries, inter alia, by preventing third parties 
from violating the right in other countries “if they are able to influence these third 
parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and applicable international law”); Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. 
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15, ¶ 33, U.N. Docs. 
E/C.12/2002/11 (2003) (making explicit reference to preventing companies from 
violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries); 
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 
19, ¶ 54, U.N. Docs. E/C.12/GC/19 (2009).   
 Similar statements have been made through the use of concluding observations.  
See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 
Canada, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007); Comm. on the Elimination 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered one impediment to access to remedy 
for victims of human rights violations at the hands of corporate 
actors, namely the corporate veil, and in light of this impediment, 
how to attribute liability to parent companies in transnational 
business and human rights litigation.  Further impediments were 
acknowledged, prominent among them the jurisdictional veil.  
Future scholarship should consider extraterritoriality in the context 
of transnational business and human rights litigation, examining the 
operation of the presumption against extraterritoriality/prohibition 
on ATS claims against foreign corporations, and the different 
approach to this issue under foreign laws such as European law.332  
The decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in Lungowe on the forum non 
conveniens question, discussed in other works,333 may be instructive. 
Future scholarship should also address the broader question of 
whether the United Kingdom—or now perhaps Canada—is 
becoming the new forum for victims to bring human rights litigation 
against corporate defendants.  The United States provided such 
victims with some prospect of access to remedy through the cause 
of action under the ATS and through a wide test for personal 
jurisdiction over corporate defendants.  The United Kingdom on the 
other hand traditionally remained adherent to the strictures of the 
corporate veil.334  This Article has plotted the trend whereby the 
United States has restricted access to remedy for such victims, 
meanwhile the United Kingdom has opened up a route for plaintiffs 
 
of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (2008); Human Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on 
the Sixth Periodic Report of Germany, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6 
(2012); see also Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 
Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Austria, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
E/C 12/AUT/CO/4 (2013); Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural 
Rts., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Norway, ¶ 6, U.N. 
Doc. E/C 12/NOR/CO/5 (2013). 
 332 For a discussion of the proper jurisdictional limits of the ATS, see Doug 
Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves 
the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014). 
 333 See Gabrielle Holly, Vedanta v. Lungowe Symposium: A Non Conveniens 




 334 Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1989] AC 433 (Eng.). 
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to attribute liability to parent companies through direct liability.  
The reticence on the part of the U.S. courts to provide access to 
remedy to foreign plaintiffs where human rights violations are 
alleged against corporate actors stands in contrast to the country’s 
willingness to extend its jurisdiction extraterritorially in other fields, 
for instance through expansive claims to jurisdiction in the field of 
competition law.335  The United Kingdom’s openness to such claims 
may in part be explained by its membership of the European Union, 
which has explicitly encouraged extraterritorial jurisdiction where 
host state remedies for business and human rights cases are elusive 
and untenable,336 prompting the question whether this trend will be 
reversed after Brexit.337  These important concerns will no doubt be 
taken up elsewhere but suffice here to say that, in line with the 
viewpoint expressed in article, it is hoped that regardless of political 
developments, the English courts will continue to develop and 
expand direct parent company liability, and that the U.S. courts will 
adopt a similar course. 
 
 335 See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Ctr. 
Inc., No. 96-170, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5816, at *137-38 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962); see 
also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 55, at 134-35. 
 336 EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
REMEDY IN THE AREA OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE EU LEVEL (2017); Access 
to Legal Remedies for Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Third 
Countries, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 603.475 (2019). 
 337 Brussels Regulation, supra note 51, no longer applies in the United 
Kingdom post Brexit.  See Aristova, supra note 200.  The decision on jurisdiction in 
Lungowe, not discussed in this article, demonstrated an expansive solution to this 
issue; the Supreme Court found that the case could proceed in England because the 
plaintiffs lacked access to substantial justice in Zambia.  It is hoped that this 
approach will continue under any new law on jurisdiction. 
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